Against Populist Isolationism: New Asian Regionalism and Global South Powers in International Economic Law by Hsieh, Pasha L.
Cornell International Law Journal
Volume 51
Number 3 Fall 2018 Article 4
Against Populist Isolationism: New Asian
Regionalism and Global South Powers in
International Economic Law
Pasha L. Hsieh
Singapore Management University School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cilj
Part of the International Trade Law Commons, and the Law and Economics Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Cornell International Law Journal by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more information,
please contact jmp8@cornell.edu.
Recommended Citation
Hsieh, Pasha L. (2018) "Against Populist Isolationism: New Asian Regionalism and Global South Powers in International Economic
Law," Cornell International Law Journal: Vol. 51 : No. 3 , Article 4.
Available at: https://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cilj/vol51/iss3/4
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CIN\51-3\CIN303.txt unknown Seq: 1  8-FEB-19 14:48
Against Populist Isolationism:
New Asian Regionalism and Global
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This Article provides the most up-to-date examination of the Regional
Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), which is poised to become
the world’s largest free trade agreement (FTA).  It argues that the 16-coun-
try mega-FTA will galvanize the paradigm shift in Asian regionalism and
build a normative foundation for the Global South in international eco-
nomic law.  Based on intertwined theoretical and substantive claims, this
Article opens an inquiry into the assertive legalism of developing nations
in the new regional economic order.  It further manifests the pivotal force
of emerging economies against populist isolationism in the Trump era that
undermines the neoliberal foundation of global trade liberalization.
By analyzing the converging policies of the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN), China and India, the Article first demonstrates the
status of the RCEP in Asian powers’ contemporary FTA practice.  In light of
the ASEAN Economic Community, the new 11-member Trans-Pacific Part-
nership and EU FTAs with Singapore and Vietnam, caution should be given
to the utilization of tariff preferences, services liberalization and investor-
state dispute settlement.  Finally, the Article assesses the RCEP’s systemic
impact on the legal fragmentation due to jurisdictional conflicts under
trade and investment agreements.  The consolidation of divergent trade
rules and the pro-development operative mechanism will arguably fortify
the RCEP as a pathway to the Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific region and
reinvigorate the multilateral trading system.
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Introduction
International economic law and the Global South are at a crossroads
in the era of populist isolationism.1  The resurgence of Westphalian sover-
eignty in economic policy has endangered the neoliberal basis of free trade
that has underpinned the world’s development since the inception of the
postwar Bretton Woods system.2  Evolving mega-regionals were once per-
ceived to remedy the long-standing impasse of the World Trade Organiza-
tion’s Doha Round.  Nevertheless, the globalization backlash, evidenced by
Brexit, and the Trump Administration’s withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific
Partnership (TPP), has invigorated developing countries to pursue a new
normative foundation for economic integration.3
Trade nationalism across the Atlantic has not deterred the dynamic
development of Asian regionalism, which is witnessing a nearly four-fold
1. See Arif Dirlik, Global South: Predicament and Promise, 1 GLOBAL SOUTH 12,
12– 15 (2007) (analyzing the notion of the Third World and the South); Deniz Altinbas¸,
South-South Cooperation: A Counter-Hegemonic Movement?, in THE RISE OF THE GLOBAL
SOUTH: PHILOSOPHICAL, GEOPOLITICAL AND ECONOMIC TRENDS OF THE 21ST CENTURY 29, 29
n.1 (Justin Dargin ed., 2013) (clarifying the North-South divide in global politics).
2. For the nexus between sovereignty and emerging trade protectionism, see
Shuaihua Cheng, To Open up Global Trade We Need to Understand ‘Protectionism,’ WORLD
ECONOMIC FORUM (June 13, 2017), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2017/06/global-
trade-protectionism-g20-explained/ [https://perma.cc/AT65-LXT5]; Douglas A. Irwin,
The False Promise of Protectionism: Why Trump’s Trade Policy Could Backfire, 96 FOREIGN
AFF. 45, 45– 53 (2017).
3. For the impact of Brexit and the US withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partner-
ship  on Asian states, see Hoang Thi Ha et. al., ASEAN’s Reflections from Brexit, 9 ASEAN
FOCUS 19, 20– 21 (2016); Marina Tsirbas et. al., The Future of the TPP, 11 ASEAN FOCUS
8, 10– 15 (2016).
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growth of free trade agreements (FTAs) that represent half of global trade
pacts.4  A salient feature of Asian FTAs is the transformation of conven-
tional South-South geopolitical cooperation into new-generation economic
instruments.  As the most ambitious mega-regional agreement led by the
Global South, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP)
is poised to be the world’s largest FTA in 2018.5
Built upon the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) FTAs,
the 16 RCEP countries account for 32% of world goods-exports and 28% of
global gross domestic product (GDP).6  Incorporating the world’s ten most
vigorous economies, including ASEAN states, China and India, contributes
to the bloc’s GDP growth rate of 4.6%, which is more than double that of
the United States or the European Union.7  More fundamentally, the RCEP
agenda will converge fragmented trade rules and the economic priorities of
Asia’s powerhouses, such as the ASEAN centrality, Beijing’s “One Belt One
Road” (OBOR) initiative, and New Delhi’s Act East Policy.8
Double the economic scale of the “reborn” TPP, which is the now 11-
party Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partner-
ship (CPTPP),9 the RCEP will be the most critical milestone since the Asia-
4. The number of Asian free trade agreements (FTAs) in effect increased from 39 to
151 from 2000 to 2017. See Free Trade Agreements, tbl.1 FTAs by Status (cumulative),
ASIA REGIONAL INTEGRATION CENTER, https://aric.adb.org/fta (last visited Oct. 31, 2018);
see also WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, Regional Trade Agreements,https://www.wto.org/
english/Tratop_e/region_e/region_e.htm [https://perma.cc/VQ2H-SLW9] (last visited
Oct. 31, 2018) (“As of 1 May 2018, 287 RTAs were in force.”).
5. See Giovanni Di Lieto, Understanding RCEP in Xi Jinping’s World Trade Game,
ASIA TIMES (Sept. 27, 2017), http://www.atimes.com/understanding-rcep-xi-jinpings-
world-trade-game/ [https://perma.cc/32YV-7LYN].  See generally Rebecca Fatima Sta
Maria, RCEP More Relevant Now Than Ever, STRAITS TIMES (Jan. 18, 2017), http://
www.straitstimes.com/opinion/rcep-more-relevant-now-than-ever [https://perma.cc/
E3A7-NJ6W].
6. External ASEAN FTAs were concluded between ten ASEAN states collectively
with China, Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, India, and Hong Kong. See
Sanchita Basu Das, Rahul Sen & Sadhana Srivastava, Can ASEAN+1 FTAs Be a Pathway
towards Negotiating and Designing the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership
(RCEP) Agreement? 50 J. WORLD TRADE 253, 254– 60 (2016); Yoshifumi Fukunaga &
Ikumo Isono, Taking ASEAN+1 FTAs towards the RCEP: A Mapping Study 4– 6 (European
Res. Inst. For ASEAN, ERIA Discussion Paper Series, 2013), http://www.eria.org/ERIA-
DP-2013-02.pdf [https://perma.cc/U2EZ-MD6V]; ANDREW STAPLES, THE ECONOMIST,
ASEAN CONNECTIONS: HOW MEGA-REGIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT INITIATIVES IN ASIA WILL
SHAPE BUSINESS STRATEGY IN ASEAN AND BEYOND 13 (2016).  As a comparison, 11 TPP
members and the United States encompass 26% of world goods-exports and 32% of
global GDP.
7. See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, THE LONG VIEW: HOW WILL THE GLOBAL ECO-
NOMIC ORDER CHANGE BY 2050? 7 (2017); ERIA, EAST ASIA UPDATES: SOUTHEAST ASIA WILL
GROW AT 4.6% 1 (2016); ANDREW STAPLES, supra note 6, at 12– 13.
8. See Zhao Hong, China One Belt One Road: An Overview of the Debate, in 6 TRENDS
IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 1– 30 (2016) (investigating current economic policies of ASEAN,
China and India).
9. Trans-Pacific Partnership Ministerial Statement, GLOBAL AFF. CANADA (last modi-
fied Feb. 28, 2018), available at http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/trade-
agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/cptpp-ptpgp/statement-declaration.
aspx?lang-eng?lang=Eng&lang=Eng [https://perma.cc/74QP-PC8W] [hereinafter TPP
Statement]; see Minister Champagne Welcomes Progress on the Comprehensive and Pro-
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Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) was established in 1989.10  To a
large extent, premature aspirations for the TPP have overshadowed aca-
demic and policy discourse on the RCEP.  To fill a much-needed gap in the
legal literature, this Article offers a timely and ‘on the ground’ response to
the systemic implications of the RCEP for international economic law.  By
making interrelated theoretical and substantive claims, this Article opens
an inquiry into the assertive legalism of developing countries in the new
regional economic order (NREO).11  The new-generation South-South FTAs
that underpin the NREO also manifest the pivotal role of Global South
powers in reshaping world order amid Trump-era populist isolationism.
This Article argues that the emerging RCEP represents the NREO,
which will prompt paradigm shifts in Asian regionalism and construct a
normative foundation for the Global South in international economic law.
It further contends that revolutionizing the RCEP as Asia’s economic
framework mandates commitments beyond ASEAN+1 FTAs and the new
ASEAN Economic Community (AEC).  The roadmap, which considers the
nexus between the AEC Blueprint 2025 and Asia-Pacific trade pacts, will
necessitate the realization of the Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific
(FTAAP) and reenergize the Doha round talks.12
This Article proceeds as follows.  Part I provides the geopolitical con-
text of Asian regionalism by deciphering the progress and impediments of
mega-regionals and South-based agreements in Third Regionalism.13  To
buttress the NREO argument, the analysis offers insight into the RCEP’s
development, negotiating structure and constitutional issues that commen-
tators overlook.  By deciphering ASEAN, China and India’s legal strategies,
it explains the Global South’s contemporary practice of international eco-
nomic law.  Part II substantiates the RCEP’s paradigm shifts in Asian
regionalism.  Based on ASEAN+1 FTAs and the AEC being implemented, it
gressive Trans-Pacific Partnership, Global Aff. Canada (Nov. 10, 2017), available at
https://www.canada.ca/en/global-affairs/news/2017/11/minister_champagnewel
comesprogressonthecomprehensiveandprogressi.html [https://perma.cc/R8DH-UEME]
(“The members of the CPTPP represent 494 million people, with . . . 13.6% of global
GDP”).
10. See APEC, APEC OUTCOMES & OUTLOOK 48– 51 (2016– 2017) (explaining the
milestones of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) since 1989) [hereinafter
APEC 2016– 17].
11. Although the term, new regional economic order (NREO), was previously used
by commentators, none of them have substantiated the theoretical or substantive claims
related to mega-regionals and Asian regionalism. See, e.g., Adriano R. Garcia, Toward a
New Regional Economic Order in Asian and the Pacific, X J. PHILIPPINE DEV. 45, 45– 53
(1983); Greg Fry, ‘Pooled Regional Governance’ in the Island Pacific: Lessons from History,
in PACIFIC ISLANDS REGIONAL INTEGRATION AND GOVERNANCE 89, 92 (Satish Chand ed.,
2005); KUNIKO ASHIZAWA, JAPAN, THE US, AND REGIONAL INSTITUTION-BUILDING IN THE NEW
ASIA: WHEN IDENTITY MATTERS 66 (2013).  I will make a further distinction between the
NREO and the new international economic order (NIEO) in the 1970s in subsequent
sections.
12. See APEC 2016– 2017, supra note 10, at 5, 48.
13. Built on Jagdish Bhagwati’s explanation of the first two-waves of regionalism
beginning in the 1960s and 1980s, I coined the term, Third Regionalism, which refers to
the new trends of FTAs in the Doha Round. See Jagdish Bhagwati, Regionalism versus
Multilateralism, 15 WORLD ECON. 535, 538– 42 (1992).
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challenges the loopholes of tariff eliminations and the rules of origin
(ROOs) that result in the “noodle bowl syndrome.”14  Given the recent pro-
gress of the TPP and EU FTAs with Singapore and Vietnam, it also exam-
ines the implications of professional mobility and investor-state dispute
settlement (ISDS) provisions.
Part III details the RCEP’s systemic impact on regional and multilateral
trading systems.  In particular, it sheds light on the transformation of nor-
mative conflicts amid trade fragmentation.  The overlapping jurisdiction
between intra-RCEP FTAs and bilateral investment treaties (BITs) requires
in-depth scrutiny of WTO jurisprudence and the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties (VCLT).  Moreover, the RCEP as the pathway to the APEC-
based FTAAP and the pro-development operative mechanism will be criti-
cally analyzed.  Finally, the conclusion draws together theoretical and sub-
stantive arguments and offers legal and policy advice for Asia-Pacific
governments and practitioners.
I. The RCEP in the New Regional Economic Order
The RCEP’s impact on Asian regionalism has been arguably inter-
twined with the China-US rivalry or the North-South divide.  Yet, the
existing research that discusses the TPP as the “gold standard” FTA for the
21st century has dismissed the RCEP, either explicitly or implicitly, as a
low-ambition, unpromising South-driven pact.15  This position cannot hold
true.  The populist backlash in America prompted other TPP members to
conclude the CPTPP on a smaller scale in March 2018 and substantiated
the significance of the Global South powers in world trade law.16  It is thus
vital to understand the RCEP’s evolution vis-a`-vis the legal and policy pri-
orities of stake-holding countries in the emerging NREO.
A. Asian Regionalism in Theoretical and Geopolitical Contexts
The RCEP should not be interpreted in clinical isolation from the geo-
political volatility of Asian regionalism and the Asian approach to interna-
14. See generally Richard E. Baldwin, Managing the Noodle Bowl: The Fragility ofEast
Asian Regionalism (Asian Dev. Bank, ADB Working Paper Series on Regional Economic
Integration No. 7, 2007), https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/28464/
wp07-baldwin.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q9SG-3325].
15. See, e.g., Michael Wesley, Trade Agreements and Strategic Rivalry in Asia, 69
AUSTL. J. INT’L AFF. 479, 489– 90 (2015); Deborah Kay Elms, The Trans-Pacific Partnership
Agreement: Looking Ahead to the Next Steps 8– 9 (Asian Dev. Bank Inst., ADBI Working
Paper Series No. 447, 2013), https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/
156307/adbi-wp447.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZT7S-3C5H]; Meredith Kolsky Lewis, The
TPP and the RCEP (ASEAN+6) as Potential Paths Toward Deeper Asian Economic Integra-
tion, 8 ASIAN J. WTO & INT’L HEALTH L. & POL’Y 359, 368– 69 (2013).
16. See Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership
Ministerial Statement (Mar. 8, 2018), available at https://www.beehive.govt.nz/sites/
default/files/2018-03/CPTPP%20Ministerial%20Statement.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZB3J-
6YBB]; Iman Pambagyo, RCEP is the Only Game in Town, 14 ASEAN FOCUS 26, 26– 27
(2017).  The original TPP’s ratification problems and the stalled negotiations of US-EU
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) made the RCEP a promising
mega-regional agreement.
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tional economic law.  As a mega-regional alliance, the RCEP is
representative of the NREO in Third Regionalism.  The new trend is dis-
tinct from the movement that culminated in the 1974 United Nations Gen-
eral Assembly declaration, which called for a New International Economic
Order (NIEO).17  In rationalizing global regionalism, Jagdish Bhagwati pro-
pounded the term “First Regionalism” in reference to the failure of FTAs in
the 1960s owing to overriding political interferences.18  He further
asserted that in “Second Regionalism,” robust economic motivations
prompted the success of the European single market and the North Ameri-
can Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in the 1980s and 90s.19
Following NIEO’s demise, I propose the NREO as the normative
framework to understand the contemporary dynamics of FTAs.  Built on
Bhagwati’s account, what I call “Third Regionalism” has surfaced in the
Doha Round and fertilized the NREO since the 2000s.  This new wave high-
lights a different nature of Asian regionalism that bolsters the assertive
legalism of the Global South.  The “new dependency theory” that rectifies
the classical dependency theory provides the theoretical basis for the
NREO in Third Regionalism in which the RCEP has been developed.  The
dependency school that influenced the NIEO presupposes the
underdevelopment of developing countries as the result of the North-South
neo-colonial relationship.20  As theorists contended, entrenched external
unfairness has subordinated the development of developing countries to
the self-interests of the developed nations.21  By accelerating the North-
bound trade surplus from the South, international economic relations have
only worsened the dependency and imparity.22
The classical dependency theory posits that the solution for the Global
South is to cut trade ties with the North.23  Nonetheless, the isolationist
stance contravened the economic trajectory of developing countries, partic-
ularly those that propelled contemporary Asian regionalism.  Addressing
the theoretical weakness, the new dependency theory argued for the possi-
17. See G.A. Res. 3201 (S-VI), Declaration on the Establishment of a New Interna-
tional Economic Order, U.N. Doc. A/RES/S-6/ (May 1, 1974).
18. Bhagwati, supra note 13, at 538– 39.
19. Id. at 540– 42; for different phases of Asian regionalism, see Amita Acharya,
Foundations of Collective Action in Asia: Theory and Practice of Regional Cooperation 5– 16
(Asian Dev. Bank Inst., ADBI Working Paper Series No. 344, 2012),https://
www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/156199/adbi-wp344.pdf [https://
perma.cc/776Z-QAXL]; Baldwin, supra note 14, at 7– 17.
20. See Theotonio Dos Santos, The Structure of Dependence, 60 AM. ECON. REV. 231,
232– 34 (1970); FERNANDO HENRIQUE CARDOSO & ENZO FALETTO, DEPENDENCY AND DEVEL-
OPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA 16– 17 (Marjory Mattingly Urquidi trans., 1979); GAVIN
FRIDELL, FAIR TRADE COFFEE: THE PROSPECTS AND PITFALLS OF MARKET-DRIVEN SOCIAL JUS-
TICE 31– 32 (2007).
21. See ALVIN Y. SO, SOCIAL CHANGE AND DEVELOPMENT: MODERNIZATION, DEPENDENCY,
AND WORLD-SYSTEM THEORIES 95– 102 (1990).
22. See id.
23. See id. at 104– 05.
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ble coexistence of dependency and development.24  The nature of depen-
dency is dynamic because developing nations could transform dependent
capitalism into the export-driven economies.25  Rather than becoming pre-
occupied with the unequal external relationships, the new theory empha-
sizes the impact of the South’s internal structures on changing neo-colonial
ties with the North.26
As the experiences of East Asian and ASEAN states reinforce, depen-
dency is dynamic by nature because the South could escape from depen-
dent capitalism and pursue export-driven growth.  New-generation South-
South FTAs that streamline the supply chain further augment the cost-
effectiveness and the collective power of developing nations to change the
structure with the North that was once perceived as unfair.  Consequently,
the corollaries of the new dependency theory underline the theoretical
responses to the South-initiated NREO.
Asian regionalism, which gave rise to the RCEP in the emerging NREO,
can trace its roots back to the 1955 Bandung Conference in Indonesia,
where anticolonial nationalism of Asian-African states escalated to the
Non-Aligned Movement.27  Peripheral to political solidarity, the economic
perception of South-South cooperation was to parochially enforce the
nationalistic concept of self-help by minimizing reliance on the West.28  In
the 1970s, Non-Aligned Movement states joined the Group of 77 in push-
ing for NIEO principles that demanded absolute sovereignty and affirma-
tive action in international economic law.29  Their efforts, through the UN
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), shaped the rules of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which the United States
and Europe had dominated.
The UNCTAD pushed for including core special and differential treat-
ment (SDT) provisions under the GATT, such as the non-reciprocity excep-
tion to the most-favored-nation (MFN) principle, and the 1979 Enabling
Clause that provides preferential market access for the South.30  However,
24. See id. at 164– 65; see generally FERNANDO HENRIQUE CARDOSO, REINVENTING
DEMOCRACY IN BRAZIL (1999); THOMAS BARON GOLD, STATE AND SOCIETY IN THE TAIWAN
MIRACLE (1986).
25. Based on Taiwan’s development model, Gold explained how the country trans-
formed its dependent relations with Japan and the United States to become a neoliberal
export-oriented country. See GOLD, supra note 24, at 21– 90; SO, supra note 21 at
157– 64.
26. See Katharina Serrano, The Trade-Development Nexus in EU-Pacific Relations:
Realism, Dependence or Interdependence, 23 GLOBAL CHANGE, PEACE & SECURITY 89, 104
(2011); SO, supra note 21, at 137– 42.
27. Acharya, supra note 19, at 5– 7.
28. See id.
29. Karl P. Sauvant, The Early Days of the Group of 77, UN CHRONICLE (May 2014),
https://unchronicle.un.org/article/early-days-group-77 [https://perma.cc/7HVR-GJ3F];
MINISTRY OF EXTERNAL AFF. (India), History and Evolution of Non-Aligned Movement (Aug.
22, 2012), http://mea.gov.in/in-focus-article.htm?20349/History+and+Evolution+
of+NonAligned+Movement [https://perma.cc/DJZ6-J6NK].
30. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) (1994), art. XXXVI:8; Differen-
tial and More Favorable Treatment of Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing
Countries, GATT Doc. L/4903, Nov. 28, 1979.  The contracting parties of the GATT
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the NIEO movement quickly faded because of the Thatcher-Reagan coali-
tion’s refusal to additional demands and non-uniform interests within the
Global South.31  The rising Washington Consensus became the dominant
driving force for creating the WTO and compelled developing nations to
engage in North-defined “free trade.”32  Since its inception, the WTO has
been criticized for ignoring the development needs of the South.
The NREO is a reaction to the South’s frustrations over the existing
global economic order.  Two paramount factors in Third Regionalism galva-
nized the convergence of polices of Global South powers in creating the
RCEP.  First, the deviation from the US-centric “unipolar moment” to mul-
tipolar trade governance became a reality in the Doha Round.33  Asia’s
ascending economies have weakened Washington’s hegemonic power and
materialized multipolar reality.  In 2016, the Obama government’s “pivot to
Asia” strategy culminated in the inking of the TPP, which was seen as an
initiative to tackle a rising China.34  However, soaring populist isolation-
ism in the United States has undermined the TPP’s strategic goals and the
cross-Atlantic alliance on which the NIEO once relied.35  The stalled Trans-
atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) negotiations and the EU
agreements with ASEAN states have also aggravated the Western powers’
divergent paths.36
adopted the permanent Enabling Clause after the 1971 decision that granted a ten-year
waiver allowing generalized system of preferences to depart from GATT norms.  Genera-
lized System of Preferences, Decision of 25 June 1971, L/3545, June 28, 1971.
31. See JAMES M. CYPHER, THE PROCESS OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 238 (4th ed.
2014); U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, Trade and Development Report, 2014
67– 68, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/TDR/2014 (Sept. 10, 2014).
32. See John Williamson, A Short History of the Washington Consensus, in THE WASH-
INGTON CONSENSUS RECONSIDERED: TOWARDS A NEW GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 14, 16– 17
(Narc´ıs Serra & Joseph E. Stiglitz eds., 2008); SONIA E. ROLLAND, DEVELOPMENT AT THE
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 51 (2012); Chantal Thomas & Joel P. Trachtman, Editors’
Introduction, in DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE WTO LEGAL SYSTEM 1, 9 (Chantal Thomas
& Joel P. Trachtman eds., 2009).
33. For the unipolar and multi-polar discussions, see generally Charles Krautham-
mer, The Unipolar Moment, 70 FOREIGN AFF. 23 (1990– 91); William W. Burke-White,
Power Shifts in International Law: Structure Realignment and Substantive Pluralism, 56
HARV. INT’L L.J. 1 (2015).
34. See Hillary Clinton, America’s Pacific Century, 189 FOREIGN POL’Y 56, 60– 62
(2011); David Nakamura, Obama Turns on Personal Appeal while Trying to Bolster His
Pivot to Asia, WASH. POST (Nov. 20, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/
obama-tries-to-land-his-pivot-to-asia/2015/11/20/e2222e62-8e8b-11e5-ae1f-af
46b7df8483_story.html [https://perma.cc/F5G6-5VPH]; IAN F. FERGUSSON & BROCK R.
WILLIAMS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44489, THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP (TPP): KEY
PROVISIONS AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 1– 6 (2016).
35. See Taesuh Cha, The Return of Jacksonianism: the International Implications of the
Trump Phenomenon, 39 WASH. Q. 83, 91 (2017).
36. See Szu Ping Chan, New Trade War Threatens Global Order as TTIP Talks Stall,
TELEGRAPH (Sept. 3, 2016), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2016/09/03/new-
trade-war-threatens-global-order-as-ttip-talks-stall/ [https://perma.cc/YZ9Q-GYD7].  The
EU concluded FTAs with Singapore and Vietnam and resumed negotiations for the EU-
ASEAN FTA. See TRADE FOR ALL: TOWARDS A MORE RESPONSIBLE TRADE AND INVESTMENT
POLICY, EUROPEAN COMMISSION 30– 32 (2015)
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Second, South-South FTAs concluded between developing countries
have departed from the NIEO’s ideological bedrock of the North-South con-
flicts.  As the new dependency theory suggests, developing countries and
least developed countries (LDCs), such as Vietnam and Myanmar, diamet-
rically shifted their policies from import substitution to export-driven ori-
entation.  Moreover, the West’s economic slowdown and Asia’s increasing
intraregional trade led to South-South FTAs representing two-thirds of
FTAs and substantially outpacing the North-South FTAs.37  Different from
their predecessors, more than 70% of today’s Asian trade pacts encompass
WTO-plus commitments.38  This development illustrates how the assertive
legalism of developing nations makes the South the center of the hub-and-
spoke system.
B. The Global South’s Practice of International Economic Law
The theoretical and geopolitical explanations shed light on the Global
South’s search for new norms to guide their international economic law
development.  In Second Regionalism, APEC’s formation escalated aspira-
tions for Asian integration.  Nevertheless, the institutional weakness of
APEC’s soft-law approach has crippled the intended result of the Bogor
Goals to achieve “free and open trade and investment in the Asia-Pacific” by
2020.39  Renewed momentum for regionalism surged after the Asian finan-
cial crisis in 1997.  Widespread frustrations over US-dominated global
financial institutions invigorated the ASEAN+3 framework for currency
stability.40
At the inception of Third Regionalism, China and Japan vigorously
vied for the regional leadership.  The East Asian Vision Group, set up
under the ASEAN+3 structure, proposed the East Asian Free Trade Area
37. WTO, World Trade Report 2011: The WTO and Preferential Trade Agreements:
From Co-existence to Coherence 52– 53 (2011) [hereinafter World Trade Report 2011].
In 2015, Asia’s intraregional trade was 57.1%, higher than intra-regional trade in North
America (64%) and lower than the European Union (EU) (63%). ASIAN DEVELOPMENT
BANK, ASIAN ECONOMIC INTEGRATION REPORT 2016: WHAT DRIVES FOREIGN DIRECT INVEST-
MENT IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC? 18 (2016).
38. See, e.g., Richard Baldwin & Masahiro Kawai, Multilateralizing Asian Regionalism
8– 9 (Asian Dev. Bank Inst., ADBI Working Paper Series No. 431, 2013), https://
www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/156286/adbi-wp431.pdf [https://
perma.cc/M2T4-WLTQ] (finding that 77% (53) of surveyed FTAs in Asia partially (37 or
54%) or completely (16 or 23%) include Singapore issues).
39. See APEC Economic Leaders’ Declaration of Common Resolve, ASIA-PACIFIC
ECON. COOPERATION (Nov. 16, 1994), https://www.apec.org/Meeting-Papers/Leaders-
Declarations/1994/1994_aelm [https://perma.cc/UX56-25SY] [hereinafter 1994 Lead-
ers’ Declaration] (stating that industrialized economies and developing economies
should achieve the goals by 2010 and 2020, respectively).
40. The “ASEAN+3” framework includes ten ASEAN countries, China, Japan and
South Korea.  Shujiro Urata, Constructing and Multilateralizing the Regional Comprehen-
sive Economic Partnership: An Asian Perspective 7– 8 (Asian Dev. Bank Inst., ADBI Work-
ing Paper Series No. 449, 2013), https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/
156303/adbi-wp449.pdf (economic cooperation later led to such regionalism as
CEPEA/EAFTA).  The result was the creation of the currency swap arrangement called
the Chiang Mai Initiative, the predecessor to the Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralisation
Agreement.
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CIN\51-3\CIN303.txt unknown Seq: 10  8-FEB-19 14:48
692 Cornell International Law Journal Vol. 51
(EAFTA) in 2001.41  While Beijing backed the EAFTA initiative, Tokyo
countered it with the alternative ASEAN+6 Comprehensive Economic Part-
nership for East Asia (CEPEA) in 2006.42  In Japan’s view, the CEPEA
could deepen the foundation of the Fukuda Doctrine by enhancing
ASEAN-Japan ties, and the inclusion of India, Australia and New Zealand
would counterbalance Chinese influence.43
During the same period, the FTAAP proposal and US accession to the
TPP further complicated the roadmap for Asian regionalism.44  To avoid
being marginalized and to fortify the bloc’s centrality, ASEAN states intro-
duced the framework for the “ASEAN-led process” to integrate FTA part-
ners in 2011.45  Based on ASEAN’s 2012 Guiding Principles for the RCEP,
the 16-party negotiations essentially merged EAFTA and CEPEA proposals
and expect to create the world’s most significant mega-regional deal by
2018.46  In my view, the converging polices of ASEAN, China and India
41. See REPORT OF THE EAST ASIAN VISION GROUP II (EAVGII) 43– 46 (2013); Christo-
pher M. Kent, East Asian Integration Towards An East Asian Economic Community 23
(Asian Dev. Bank Inst., ADBI Working Paper Series No. 665, 2017), https://
www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/228896/adbi-wp665.pdf [https://
perma.cc/3CFP-WYM4].
42. In addition, Japan favored the ASEAN+6-based Comprehensive Economic Part-
nership for East Asia (CEPEA) because it was based on Japan’s proposal and it was the
work of the Japanese government-funded think tank, the Economic Research Institute
for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA). See Rodolfo C. Severino, Japan’s Relations with ASEAN,
in ASEAN-JAPAN RELATIONS 17, 27– 28 (Takashi Shiraishi & Takaaki Kojima eds., 2014).
See also Shujiro Urata, CEPEA: Japan’s New Regional Cooperation Initiative in East Asia,
JAPAN SPOTLIGHT, Nov./Dec. 2008, at 12.
43. See SUEO SUDO, JAPAN’S ASEAN POLICY: IN SEARCH OF PROACTIVE MULTILATERALISM
69– 75 (2015) (explaining the origin and principles of the Fukuda Doctrine); see also
Seungjoo Lee, Institutional Balancing and the Politics of Mega-FTAs in East Asia, 56 ASIAN
SURVEY 1055, 1069 (2016) (“Japan has attempted to take advantage of US influence to
hold China in check.”).
44. See generally Pasha L. Hsieh, Reassessing APEC’s Role as a Trans-Regional Eco-
nomic Architecture: Legal and Policy Dimensions, 16 J. INT’L ECON. L. 119, 142– 43 (2013);
FERGUSSON & WILLIAMS, supra note 34, at 1– 2.
45. See ASEAN, ASEAN Framework for Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership
(June 12, 2012), available at https://asean.org/?static_post=Asean-framework-for-
regional-comprehensive-economic-partnership [https://perma.cc/X3VA-9G2P].
46. See Guiding Principles and Objectives for Negotiating the Regional Comprehensive
Economic Partnership, ASEAN (2012) [hereinafter Guiding Principles].  The first round
of negotiations took place in Brunei in 2013 and the 18th round of negotiations was
held in Vietnam in 2017. See Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership: News, DEP’T
FOREIGN AFF. & TRADE (Austl.), https://dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/negotiations/rcep
/news/Pages/news.aspx [https://perma.cc/E3TC-EUTG]  (last visited Nov. 1, 2018).
The deadline for the RCEP’s conclusion has shifted from 2015 to 2018. See Leader’s
Statement on the Negotiations for the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership
(RCEP), DEP’T FOREIGN AFF. & TRADE (Austl.) (Nov. 2017), https://dfat.gov.au/trade/
agreements/negotiations/rcep/news/Documents/joint-leaders-statement-on-the-rcep-
negotiations-14-november-2017-manila-philippines.pdf [https://perma.cc/XG7R-2KBX];
Amiti Sen, RCEP Talks: India under Pressure to Offer Deeper Tariff Cuts, HINDU BUSINESS
LINE (May 3, 2017), http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/economy/policy/rcep-talks-
india-under-pressure-to-offer-deeper-tariff-cuts/article9679098.ece [https://perma.cc/
SAU8-LEEK]. See also IISD, RCEP partners miss third deadline and push negotiations
through November 2018, INVESTMENT TREATY NEWS (Dec. 21, 2017), https://
www.iisd.org/itn/2017/12/21/rcep-partners-miss-third-deadline-and-push-negotiations-
through-november-2018/ [https://perma.cc/U6S5-B2TY]; Kentaro Iwamoto, Conclusion
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reinforce the status of the RCEP in global regionalism and their contempo-
rary FTA practice.  More fundamentally, these new polices help resist ris-
ing trade protectionism in the West and represent the assertive legalism of
Global South powers in pursuing the NREO.
1. ASEAN
Contrary to the common misconception that China has dominated
RCEP negotiations, in reality the RCEP has been driven by ASEAN.47
While China and Japan could not agree on the EAFTA and the CEPEA pro-
posals, the two largest Asian economies compromised by enabling ASEAN
to drive the RCEP process.  From legal and political perspectives, relying on
the existing frameworks of ASEAN+1 FTAs and the AEC constitutes the
most feasible option for the unprecedented mega-regional pact.  The
ASEAN-initiated RCEP would also serve as a normative basis for pro-devel-
opment FTAs.
ASEAN’s internal and external integration provides the foundation for
the RCEP that covers ASEAN’s ten-member states and six-FTA partners.
While the existing literature predominantly links the RCEP to ASEAN+1
FTAs, it is incorrect to ignore the implementation of the AEC.48  The 1967
Bangkok Declaration gave birth to ASEAN by forming a loose security alli-
ance that sought to contain widespread communism.49  Resting upon the
Indonesian concepts of musyawarah and mufakat, the postcolonial mind-
set led to the “ASEAN way,” which established the bloc’s non-intervention
principle based on consultation and consensus.50
The constitutional moment was the enactment of the ASEAN Charter
to codify the established practice and confer legal personality on ASEAN
“as an inter-governmental” organization.51  Distinguishable from the super-
national EU, ASEAN has operated under a soft-law horizontal integration
model rather than a top-down, hard-law approach.  A result of this differ-
ence is the lack of ASEAN law’s “direct effect” to override domestic law.
Although the Charter requires members to “take all necessary measures” to
implement ASEAN treaties, national constitutions are unlikely to be inter-
to RCEP talks ‘finally in sight,’ Singapore PM says, NIKKEI ASIAN REV. (Aug. 29, 2018),
https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-Relations/Conclusion-to-RCEP-talks-
finally-in-sight-Singapore-PM-says [https://perma.cc/7DTS-PQBP].
47. See Maria, supra note 5; see also Pambagyo, supra note 16, at 27 (“[T]here has R
been no sign or sense that China has become more pro-active in RCEP negotiations
other than a significant increase in the number of participants in the Chinese
delegation.”).
48. An analysis of ASAEN+1 FTAs is the conventional approach to understanding the
RCEP. E.g., Das et. al., supra note 6, at 262– 74; Fukunaga & Isono, supra note 6, at R
8– 18; Urata, supra note 40, at 12– 17.
49. See RODOLFO C. SEVERINO, SOUTHEAST ASIA IN SEARCH OF AN ASEAN COMMUNITY:
INSIGHTS FROM THE FORMER ASEAN SECRETARY-GENERAL 1– 11 (2006).
50. See id.; INGO VENZKE AND LI-ANN THIO, THE INTERNAL EFFECTS OF ASEAN EXTERNAL
RELATIONS 9– 17 (2016).
51. ASEAN, Charter of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations art. 3 (2007) [here-
inafter ASEAN Charter].
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preted as granting such treaties self-executing power.52
As an integral part of the RCEP, the AEC represents a breakthrough in
the NREO.  In 2015, the creation of the AEC culminated ASEAN’s internal
integration that began with the 1993 ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA).53
The AEC architecture comprises new-generation South-based pacts.  To
remedy the AFTA’s low-utilization, the ASEAN Trade in Goods Agreement
(ATIGA) consolidated previous agreements on goods and reduced non-
tariff barriers.54  As of 2017, the negotiations under the ASEAN Frame-
work Agreement on Services (AFAS) have led to the ratification of nine
packages of service commitments.55  The ASEAN Comprehensive Invest-
ment Agreement (ACIA) streamlined the schedule of reservations and
enhanced the investor-state arbitration mechanism.56  These commitments
and the AEC Blueprint 2025’s target to build “a highly integrated and cohe-
sive economy” collectively form the benchmark for RCEP negotiations.57
A key point should be highlighted.  The new Blueprint’s “global
ASEAN” initiative places the RCEP as ASEAN’s priority.58  From 2002 to
2017, ASEAN concluded six ASEAN+1 FTAs with seven Asia-Pacific part-
ners, including Australia, China and India.59  Akin to the AEC, the
52. Id. at art. 5, ¶ 2; see Diane A. Desierto, ASEAN’s Constitutionalization of Interna-
tional Law: Challenges to Evolution under the New ASEAN Charter, 49 COLUM. J. TRANS-
NAT’L L. 268, 300– 03 (2011) (interpreting pertinent constitutional provisions of ASEAN
states).
53. See SEVERINO, supra note 49, at 222– 25; see also Masahiro Kawai & Kanda
Naknoi, ASEAN Economic Integration through Trade and Foreign Direct Investment: Long-
Term Challenges 12– 13 (ADBI Working Paper Series No. 545, 2015), https://
www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/174835/adbi-wp545.pdf [https://
perma.cc/2T7M-F5X2].  Note that in 2007, ASEAN approved the ASEAN Economic
Community (AEC) Blueprint 2015 with the intention to form “a single market and pro-
duction base” in 2015.  ASEAN, ASEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY BLUEPRINT 5– 6 (2008)
[hereinafter AEC BLUEPRINT 2015].  The AEC Blueprint 2025, which will govern ASEAN’s
development from 2016 to 2025, replaced the AEC Blueprint 2015 when the AEC was
established. See ASEAN, ASEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY BLUEPRINT 2025 1– 2 (2015)
[hereinafter AEC BLUEPRINT 2025].
54. See Kanya Satyani Sasradipoera, ASEAN Trade in Goods Agreement (ATIGA), in
ASEAN: LIFE AFTER THE CHARTER 89, 90– 92 (S. Tiwari ed., 2010); see STEFANO INAMA &
EDMUND W. SIM, RULES OF ORIGIN IN ASEAN: A WAY FORWARD 10, 21– 23 (J.H.H. Weller,
Tan Hsien-Li, & Michael Ewing-Chow eds., 2015).
55. Also note that the conclusion of the final, tenth package of commitments was
postponed from 2015 to 2017. See Deunden Nikomborirak & Supunnavadee
Jitdumrong, An Assessment of Services Sector Liberalization in ASEAN, in ASEAN ECO-
NOMIC COMMUNITY SCORECARD: PERFORMANCE AND PERCEPTION 47, 53 (Sanchita Basu Das
ed., 2013); see also Chairman’s Statement on the 28th and 29th ASEAN Summits, Turn-
ing Vision into Reality for a Dynamic ASEAN Community 10 (Sept. 6– 7, 2016), available
at https://asean.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/LN-02-Chairmans-Statement-of-the-
28th-29th-ASEAN-Summits.pdf [https://perma.cc/QK2E-W8Q6].
56. See ASEAN, ASEAN COMPREHENSIVE INVESTMENT AGREEMENT: A GUIDEBOOK FOR
BUSINESS & INVESTORS 9– 11 (2013).
57. AEC BLUEPRINT 2025, supra note 53, at 3.  Presumably due to the challenge of
meeting all targets in the AEC Blueprint 2015, the new Blueprint dropped the term “sin-
gle market.”
58. Id. at 35– 36.
59. For the treaty texts, see Free Trade Agreements with Dialogue Partners, ASEAN,
available at http://asean.org/asean-economic-community/free-trade-agreements-with-
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ASEAN+1 FTAs have strengthened the notion of ASEAN centrality, which
the ASEAN Charter mandated to secure the bloc’s economic and geopoliti-
cal relevance.60  This concept empowers ASEAN to be an indispensable
middle power in Asian regionalism.61  Although policy debates on the
RCEP have revolved around ASEAN+1 FTAs, their differences in legal struc-
tures and commitments could endanger the RCEP.  The ASEAN-Australia-
New Zealand FTA (AANZFTA) is the most comprehensive single-undertak-
ing FTA.62  Other ASEAN+1 FTAs have followed the incremental approach
by enacting a framework agreement that facilitates the conclusion of secto-
rial agreements on trade in goods, services, investment and dispute settle-
ment.  The “incomplete” exception is the ASEAN-Japan FTA that merely
finalized the agreement on goods because of Tokyo’s reliance on higher
commitments in seven bilateral FTAs with ASEAN states.63
Significantly, notwithstanding the treaty-making power provision
under the ASEAN Charter, the application of the EU concept of compe-
tence by member states on ASEAN to conclude treaties does not extend to
those that will “create obligations upon individual” states.64  Thus, the
Charter did not alter the negotiating practice of ASEAN+1 FTAs or the
RCEP.  Seeking the converged position at the “ASEAN Caucus” meeting
prior to RCEP negotiations is perceived as a political exercise rather than a
dialogue-partners/ [https://perma.cc/5D38-RBHC]. See Joint Media Statement, The
Signing of the ASEAN-Hong Kong, China Free Trade Agreement and the ASEAN-Hong
Kong, China Investment Agreement 1 (Nov. 2017), available at https://asean.org/stor-
age/2017/11/FINAL-JMS-on-the-signing-of-AHKFTA-and-AHKIA.pdf [https://perma.cc/
EX3E-9DP8] [hereinafter ASEAN-Hong Kong Statement].
60. See AEC BLUEPRINT 2025, supra note 53, at 6.  For the development of the ASEAN
centrality since the 1990s, see WALTER WOON, THE ASEAN CHARTER: A COMMENTARY
56– 58 (2016). See also Yoshifumi Fukunaga, ASEAN’s Leadership in the Regional Com-
prehensive Economic Partnership, 2 ASIA & PAC. POL’Y STUDIES 103, 106 (2015).
61. ASEAN exercises power as a collective bloc and is thus distinct from traditional
middle powers such as Australia and New Zealand.  For the definitions of middle pow-
ers, see Eduard Jordaan, The Concept of a Middle Power in International Relations: Distin-
guishing Between Emerging and Traditional Middle Powers, 30 POLITIKON: SOUTH AFRICAN
JOURNAL OF POLITICAL STUDIES 165, 165– 75 (2010). See also Andrew Carr, Is Australia a
Middle Power? A Systemic Impact Approach, 68 AUSTL. J. INT’L AFF. 70, 70– 81 (2014).
62. See ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand Free Trade Agreement (AANZFTA), AANZFTA
(Sept. 15, 2017), http://aanzfta.asean.org/key-aanzfta-trade-figures/ [https://perma.cc/
K4GG-KRT8].  For additional detailed information on AANZFTA, see ASEAN-Australia-
New Zealand FTA, DEP’T FOREIGN AFF. & TRADE (AUSTL.), https://dfat.gov.au/trade/agree-
ments/in-force/aanzfta/Pages/asean-australia-new-zealand-free-trade-agreement.aspx
[https://perma.cc/VWB7-96KX] .
63. The framework agreement and the agreement on goods were concluded in 2003
and 2008, respectively. See ASEAN— Japan Free Trade Area, ASEAN, http://asean.org/
?static_post=Asean-japan-free-trade-area-2 [https://perma.cc/9YC7-NBZC] (last visited
Nov. 2, 2018).  Japan has concluded FTAs with Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philip-
pines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam.  Trade Policy Review Body, Trade Policy
Review: Report by the Secretariat: Japan, WTO Doc. WT/TPR/S/351, at 24 (Jan. 18,
2017); see Severino, supra note 42, at 26– 27; see also David Chin Soon Siong, ASEAN’s
Journey towards Free Trade, in ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY: ESSAYS AND REFLECTIONS BY SINGA-
PORE’S NEGOTIATIONS 209, 229– 30 (C. L. Lim & Margaret Liang eds., 2011).
64. See ASEAN Charter, supra note 51, at art. 41, ¶ 7; Rules of Procedure for Conclu-
sion of International Agreements by ASEAN, ASEAN Rule 1 (Nov. 11, 2011).
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legal obligation.65  Therefore, political consensus among ten-ASEAN states
is essential to ensure the status of the AEC in the NREO and to fortify the
concept of the ASEAN centrality in the RCEP.
2. China
As part of the Global South, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has
emerged as a global economic power since its open-door policy com-
menced in 1978.  Based on the evolution of socialism with Chinese charac-
teristics, the Beijing Consensus allegedly provides developing nations with
an alternative model to the Washington Consensus.66  China’s trade strat-
egy illustrates its changing international law practices.  A desire to assert
the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party motivated China’s acces-
sion to the UN and the WTO.  In Third Regionalism, China has trans-
formed from a passive participant to an assertive stakeholder on global
rule-making.  The PRC’s new great-power status under the principle of
“peaceful development,” which replaced “peaceful rise” that suggested
Sino-centric hegemony, has galvanized the Xi Jinping administration to fill
the political vacuum in the wake of US isolationism.67
Against this backdrop, three prime considerations underpin China’s
legal and political approach to the RCEP and other FTAs.  First, as the larg-
est RCEP economy, which accounts for one-third of RCEP GDP, this FTA
augments China’s right of discourse in international law.68  China has
been a beneficiary of the capitalist, neoliberal trading system.  The post-
Mao regime has never challenged the normality of the “Western” rules that
sustain the system.  Instead, China has maximized its influence over global
rule-making.  Being a core RCEP member allows China to construct the
legal pathway to the FTAAP.  The Obama-backed TPP once posed threats to
Beijing’s strategy.  China’s TPP standpoint is exemplified by its accelera-
tion of bilateral FTAs and the RCEP, as well as its experiment with higher-
65. E.g., Indicative ASEAN Notional Calendar, ASEAN 7 (Aug. 9, 2017).  Technically
speaking, the Charter only requires states to “coordinate and endeavor to develop com-
mon positions.”  ASEAN Charter, supra note 51, at art. 41, ¶ 4 (2007).
66. For a detailed analysis of the Beijing Consensus, see generally THE BEIJING CON-
SENSUS? HOW CHINA HAS CHANGED WESTERN IDEAS OF LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
(Weitseng Chen ed., 2017).
67. See Congyan Cai, New Great Powers and International Law in the 21st Century, 24
EUR. J. INT’L L. 755, 786– 87 (2013) (explaining the transition from peaceful rise to
peaceful development); Tyler Soper, Full Text: China President Xi gives policy speech in
Seattle, wants to fight cybercrime with the U.S., GEEKWIRE (Sept. 22, 2015), https://
www.geekwire.com/2015/full-text-china-president-xi-gives-policy-speech-in-seattle-
pledges-to-fight-cybercrime-with-u-s/ [https://perma.cc/6YYP-7HHD](“To demonstrate
our commitment to peaceful development, I announced not long ago that the size of
China’s military will be cut by 300,000.”).
68. For China’s share of RCEP GDP, see Paul Hubbard & Dhruv Sharma, Under-
standing and Applying Long-term GDP Projections 15 (East Asian Bureau Economic
Research, EABER Working Paper Series No. 119, 2016), http://saber.eaber.org/system/
tdf/documents/EABER%20Working%20Paper%20119%20Hubbard%20Sharma.pdf?file
=1&type=node&id=25601&force= [https://perma.cc/Q743-37UH]; see also Jianmin Jin,
RCEP v. TPP, FUJITSU RES. INST. (Feb. 22, 2013), http://www.fujitsu.com/jp/group/fri/
en/column/message/2013/2013-02-22.html [https://perma.cc/S3MS-P6MA].
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CIN\51-3\CIN303.txt unknown Seq: 15  8-FEB-19 14:48
2018 Against Populist Isolationism 697
level liberalization in the Shanghai Pilot Free Trade Zone.69  Ironically, the
Trump administration’s withdrawal from the TPP pushed Washington’s
Asian allies to embrace the RCEP and enabled Beijing to carry the torch for
free trade and globalization.70
Second, an interrelated legal controversy is Section 15 of China’s Pro-
tocol of Accession to the WTO, which stipulates that the provisions
allowing WTO members to treat China as a non-market economy “shall
expire 15 years after the date of accession.”71  The non-market economy
status legalized foreign countries’ use of “surrogate” prices in anti-dump-
ing proceedings, thus making it easier to find Chinese exporters liable for
dumping.72  Rather than attacking the normative value of Section 15 that it
deems unfair, China has resorted to FTAs to circumvent the provision.  The
ASEAN-China FTA illustrates such efforts, as it accords China “full market
economy” status to the exclusion of WTO rules.73
Despite the statutory expiration of Section 15 in December 2016, the
United States, the EU, and Japan declined to alter the non-market economy
methodology owing to political sensitivity involving the inflow of Chinese
goods.74  In response, Beijing filed concurrent WTO complaints against
Washington and Brussels.75  The RCEP could compel Japan to accept the
ASEAN-China FTA practice of recognizing China as a market economy and
thus marginalize US and EU positions in the interpretation of world trade
law.
Lastly, the RCEP will advance China’s economic interests in the
NREO.  Empirical data demonstrates that the Chinese economy alone
could gain $88 billion if the TPP failed and the RCEP were passed, and this
69. See Ming Du, Explaining China’s Tripartite Strategy Toward the Trans-Pacific Part-
nership Agreement, 18 J. INT’L ECON. L. 407, 414– 30 (2015); see also Rajah & Tann, Rajah
& Tann Regional Round-up, Issue 2 –  Apr/May/Jun 2017, EOASIS, http://eoasis.rajaht
ann.com/eoasis/gn/rn2.asp?n=17&c=2#A1 [https://perma.cc/2TM9-VPA7] (“China
officially released its updated negative list for admission of foreign investment in the free
trade zones . . . .  Compared to the 2015 version, the new negative list has cut 10 items
and 27 restrictions across eight industries.”) (last visited Nov. 5, 2018).
70. See Suisheng Zhao, A Revisionist Stakeholder: China and the Post-World War II
World Order, 27 J. CONTEMP. CHINA 643, 650 (2018).
71. World Trade Organization, Accession of the People’s Republic of China, WTO Doc.
WT/L/432 (Nov. 23, 2001), at 9.
72. See Spokesman of the Ministry of Commerce Comments on China’s Indicting the US
and European Union for their Practices of Anti-dumping “Surrogate Country” in the WTO,
MINISTRY COM. CHINA (Dec. 13, 2016), http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/newsre
lease/significantnews/201612/20161202192355.shtml [https://perma.cc/URE8-
T3TU].
73. See Agreement on Trade in Goods of the Framework Agreement on Comprehen-
sive Economic Co-operation between the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the
People’s Republic of China, ASEAN-China, art. 14, Nov. 29, 2004.
74. See Shawn Donnan et. al., China Challenges EU and US over Market Economy
Status, FIN. TIMES (Dec. 12, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/6af8da62-bf5d-11e6-
9bca-2b93a6856354?mhq5j=E1 [https://perma.cc/CCB8-EXG8].
75. Request for Consultation by China, United States– Measures Related to Price Com-
parison Methodologies, WTO Doc. WT/DS515/1 (Dec. 15, 2016); Request for Consulta-
tion by China, European Union– Measures Related to Price Comparison Methodologies,
WTO Doc. WT/DS516/1 (Dec. 15, 2016).
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amount is $16 billion more than the scenario where both mega-regionals
came into effect.76  The RCEP is a key instrument to implement China’s
13th Five-Year Plan, in which the National People’s Congress first placed
the “One Belt, One Road” initiative as a national priority in 2016.77  This
initiative fortifies China’s long-standing approach to South-South coopera-
tion that emphasizes concessional loans for infrastructure building to facil-
itate the export of Chinese production, capital and labor.
Contrary to the assertion of Beijing and pro-government academics, I
argue that OBOR is primarily based on ambitious yet ambiguous policy
statements that are far from legal commitments.78  What was patently
ignored in discourse is the financial risks that could arise from investment
in many of the 68 OBOR members such as Iraq and Palestine.79  OBOR’s
few substantive results include the creation of the China-led Asian Infra-
structure Investment Bank (AIIB), which fills Asian states’ infrastructure
needs that global financial institutions fail to meet.  As more than 60 mem-
bers joined the AIIB, including all RCEP countries except Japan, the bank
will facilitate ASEAN+6 economic cooperation through its development
projects.80
76. See U.S.-CHINA ECON. AND SECURITY REV. COMM’N, 114TH CONG., 2016 REPORT at
24 (2nd sess. 2016). See also RONGLIN LI & YANG HU, RCEP, TPP AND CHINA’S FTA
STRATEGIES 9, http://www.ipekpp.com/admin/upload_files/Report_3_54_RCEP,_
6192294083.pdf [https://perma.cc/953H-QGLM] (last visited Nov. 5, 2018).
77. The One Belt, One Road (OBOR) initiative is based on Chinese President Xi’s
announcement of “the Silk Road Economic Belt” and “the 21st-century Maritime Silk
Road” in Kazakhstan and Indonesia, respectively, in 2013.  Tian Shaohui, Chronology of
China’s Belt and Road Initiative, XINHUANET (Mar. 28, 2015), http://
news.xinhuanet.com/english/2015-03/28/c_134105435.htm [https://perma.cc/P6L4-
GTEZ]. See KATHERINE KOLESKI, THE 13TH FIVE-YEAR PLAN, U.S.-CHINA ECONOMIC AND
SECURITY REVIEW COMMISSION, 3, 23 (2017), available at https://www.uscc.gov/sites/
default/files/Research/The%2013th%20Five-Year%20Plan_Final_2.14.17_
Updated%20%28002%29.pdf [https://perma.cc/FC38-3ULR] (indicating the goal of
the initiative is to “export China’s enormous excess industrial capacity and strengthen
debt-laden SOEs’ international competitiveness”).
78. See e.g., STATE COUNCIL CHINA, Full Text: Action Plan on the Belt and Road Initia-
tive (Mar. 30, 2015), http://english.gov.cn/archive/publications/2015/03/30/content_
281475080249035.htm [https://perma.cc/C2SG-PMF8].  China and Hong Kong-based
academics have attempted to link OBOR to business, investment and tax laws. See e.g.
Chao Xi, Legal and Regulatory Risks of “Belt and Road” Countries: An Index-Based
Approach, in LEGAL DIMENSIONS OF CHINA’S BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE 33, 33– 52 (Lutz-
Christian Wolff & Chao Xi eds., 2016).
79. See Juvina Lai, UN Warns about Financial Risk over China’s One Belt One Road
Project, TAIWAN NEWS (May 26, 2017), http://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/
3173396 [https://perma.cc/QCS8-LPTQ]; Chong Koh Ping, Chinese President Xi Jinp-
ing’s Belt and Road Forum Yields deals with 68 Countries and International Groups, STRAIT
TIMES (May 15, 2017), http://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/chinese-president-xi-
jinpings-belt-and-road-forum-yields-deals-with-68-countries-and [https://perma.cc/
5TBA-XQBQ]; The Belt and Road Initiative: Country Profiles, HONG KONG TRADE DEVELOP-
MENT COUNCIL (HKTDC) RES., http://china-trade-research.hktdc.com/business-news/
article/The-Belt-and-Road-Initiative/The-Belt-and-Road-Initiative-Country-Profiles/obor/
en/1/1X000000/1X0A36I0.htm [https://perma.cc/5MDS-EFMJ] (last visited Nov. 5,
2018).
80. See generally Lee Hyuntai, Kim Junyoung & Oh Yunmi, Evaluation of Recent
Development of the AIIB: The 2nd Annual Meeting of the AIIB Held in Korea and its Implica-
tions, 7 WORLD ECON. BRIEF 1, 1 (2017); Members and Prospective Members of the Bank,
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OBOR also ascended to the PRC State Council’s new FTA strategy,
which goes beyond trade commitments and extends to e-commerce and
environmental protection.81  Four of China’s FTAs encompass 13 RCEP
members.82  The ASEAN-China FTA is indicative.  As Asia’s largest South-
South FTA that is currently in force, the ASEAN-China FTA was created
under a framework agreement and four subsequent agreements signed
between 2002 and 2009.83  Despite criticism of its low liberalization level,
the ASEAN-China FTA’s “living agreement” design led to the 2011 second
package of services commitments and the 2015 protocol to upgrade goods
and investment commitments.84  Moreover, instead of joining the ASEAN-
China FTA, Hong Kong concluded a free-standing FTA with ASEAN in
November 2017.85  The ASEAN-Hong Kong FTA, the amended ASEAN-
China FTA, and China’s recent FTAs with Australia and South Korea will
shape the RCEP in line with OBOR.
3. India
India was the key stakeholder of the Bandung Conference and the
Non-Aligned Movement that championed South-South cooperation.86  In
the 1990s, the bipartisan consensus among ASEAN nations formulated the
Look East Policy in order to forge the neglected economic link to East Asia
ASIAN INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT BANK, https://www.aiib.org/en/about-aiib/govern-
ance/members-of-bank/ (last visited Nov. 5, 2018). See also Min Ye, China and Compet-
ing Cooperation in Asia-Pacific: TPP, RCEP, and the New Silk Road, 11 ASIAN SECURITY
206, 212 (2015)(“China has promoted AIIB . . . to fund infrastructure projects in coun-
tries along the new Silk Road.”).
81. See China Moves to Expedite Implementation of Free Trade Zone Strategy, HONG
KONG TRADE DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL (HKTDC) RES. (Dec. 31, 2015), https://
hkmb.hktdc.com/en/1X0A4R4N/hktdc-research/China-Moves-to-Expedite-Implementa-
tion-of-Free-Trade-Zone-Strategy [https://perma.cc/NL2M-GGPR].
82. The four FTAs are China’s FTAs with ASEAN, Australia, South Korea and Singa-
pore. See China’s Free Trade Agreement, CHINA FTA NETWORK, http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/
english/ [https://perma.cc/8LRV-5KD9] (last visited Nov. 5, 2018).
83. See ASEAN— China Free Trade Agreements, ASEAN, http://asean.org/
?static_post=Asean-china-free-trade-area-2 [https://perma.cc/WBM6-PB98] (last visited
Nov. 5, 2018). See also Free Trade Agreements with Dialogue Partners, ASEAN, https://
asean.org/asean-economic-community/free-trade-agreements-with-dialogue-partners/
#f8aa8ce43f07eaf96 [https://perma.cc/9FGT-LV4B] (last visited Nov. 5, 2018).
84. See id.; see Agreement on Trade in Services of the Framework Agreement on
Comprehensive Economic Co-operation between the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations and the People’s Republic of China, ASEAN-China, art. 23, Jan. 14, 2007 [here-
inafter ASEAN-China Agreement]; Razeen Sally, ASEAN FTAs: State of Play and Outlook
for ASEAN’s Regional and Global Integration, in THE ASEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY: A
WORK IN PROGRESS 320, 352– 53 (Sanchita Basu Das et al. eds., 2013).
85. See AEC BLUEPRINT 2025, supra note 53, at 35; ASEAN, ASEAN Economic Commu-
nity 2025 Consolidated Strategic Action Plan (Feb. 6, 2017), at 47, available at http://
asean.org/asean-updates-aec-2025-consolidated-strategic-action-plan-csap/ [https://
perma.cc/Y32J-BTSC ] [hereinafter AEC 2025 CSAP]; see ASEAN-Hong Kong Statement,
supra note 59, at 1.
86. See Acharya, supra note 19, at 5– 7; Affanul Haque, Jawaharlal Nehru— The archi-
tect of India’s foreign policy, TIMES OF INDIA (May 20, 2017), https://timesofindia.india-
times.com/india/jawaharlal-nehru-the-architect-of-indias-foreign-policy/articleshow/
58767014.cms [https://perma.cc/XBF4-XNYX].
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and counteract the rise of China.87  This post-Cold War strategy substanti-
ated the ASEAN-India Framework Agreement and bilateral FTAs with three
ASEAN countries, Japan and Korea.88  Despite these legal efforts, India is
yet to be at the core of Asian regionalism.  New Delhi is not an APEC mem-
ber and it stands outside the vertically-integrated supply chain of the East
Asian market.89  Economic data evidence India’s de facto isolation from
ASEAN.  China and South Korea constitute 15.2% and 5.4% of ASEAN’s
total trade, respectively, but India accounts for merely 2.6%.90  While
ASEAN primarily trades electrical devices with Asia-Pacific countries,
ASEAN-India trade predominantly involves raw materials, such as dairy
and mineral products.91
In Third Regionalism, India’s most compelling move is Prime Minister
Narendra Modi’s “Act East Policy,” which was declared in Myanmar in
2014.92  The new policy adopts a more action-based approach than its
predecessor by reinvigorating defense and economic ties with Asian-trad-
ing partners.  Thus, the RCEP serves as the vehicle for India to be included
in Asia-Pacific integration and benefits the “Make in India” campaign by
making the nation a manufacturing and services hub.93  The mega-regional
pact will provide Indian businesses with market access to Australia and
China.  More importantly, akin to Beijing’s motivation, the shaping of the
RCEP empowers New Delhi to be recognized as a great power in global
rule-making.
For RCEP countries, India’s participation in the pact presents opportu-
nities and risks.  The RCEP legal framework that accommodates India and
ASEAN’s LDCs, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam (collectively
known as CLMV countries) presents the normative foundation for the
Global South.  Given China’s economic slowdown, India’s astonishing 7%
GDP growth rate, and infrastructure needs will yield additional trade
gains.94  The jeopardy arises from Sino-Indian clashes that range from bor-
87. See Malla V.S.V. Prasad, Political and Security Cooperation between India and
ASEAN: Implications for Economic Cooperation, in INDIA-ASEAN ECONOMIC RELATIONS:
MEETING THE CHALLENGES OF GLOBALIZATION 267, 269– 84 (Nagesh Kumar Rahul Sen &
Mukul Asher eds., 2005); SEVERINO, supra note 49, at 290– 93.
88. See V.S. Seshadri, Evolution in India’s Regional Trading Arrangement, 43 J. WORLD
TRADE 903, 908– 09 (2009).  For a current comprehensive listing of India’s WTO notified
in force and announced RTAs,  see http://rtais.wto.org/UI/PublicSearchByMember-
Result.aspx?MemberCode=356&lang=1&redirect=1 [https://perma.cc/H59M-242S].
89. See Das et. al., supra note 7, at 262; Sally, supra note 84, at 355.
90. See ASEAN, ASEAN COMMUNITY IN FIGURES: ACIF 15 (2016), available at https://
asean.org/storage/2012/05/25Content-ACIF.pdf[ https://perma.cc/26PJ-ZDCT].
91. See id. at 24– 31.
92. See generally Prashanth Parameswaran, Modi Unveils India’s ‘Act East Policy’ to
ASEAN in Myanmar, THE DIPLOMAT (Nov. 17, 2014), http://thediplomat.com/2014/11/
modi-unveils-indias-act-east-policy-to-asean-in-myanmar/ [https://perma.cc/99CF-
WFZG].
93. See generally id.; see Sara Itagaki, Understanding India’s Evolving Role in Asia
through an ASEAN Prism: Interview with Michael Kugelman, NAT’L BUREAU OF ASIAN RES.
(Dec. 15, 2016), https://www.nbr.org/publication/understanding-indias-evolving-role-
in-asia-through-an-asean-prism/ [https://perma.cc/6AHV-CQNK].
94. See ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, ASIAN DEVELOPMENT OUTLOOK 2017 HIGHLIGHTS:
TRANSCENDING THE MIDDLE INCOME CHALLENGE xv (2017), available at https://
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CIN\51-3\CIN303.txt unknown Seq: 19  8-FEB-19 14:48
2018 Against Populist Isolationism 701
der disputes to leadership competition, which echoes China’s discord with
Japan as to the pathways to Asian regionalism.  To check Chinese domi-
nance, Singapore and Vietnam within ASEAN have actively called for
India’s greater role.95  Markedly, India did not join the Beijing-led OBOR.96
The Modi-Abe alliance created the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor that resem-
bles OBOR by focusing on infrastructure projects and capacity building.97
Such interstate dynamics inevitably influence the RCEP’s progress.
India’s conservative stance on trade liberalization has led Beijing to
accuse New Delhi of “selfishly” obstructing RCEP negotiations and has
prompted ASEAN states to consider the “ASEAN Minus X” formula.98
India’s insistence on the RCEP’s single-undertaking structure departs from
the ASEAN-India FTA, which is modeled after the ASEAN-China FTA’s
incremental building-block approach.99  The ASEAN-India services and
investment agreements were only concluded in 2014, 11 years after inking
the framework agreement.100  The prolonged process reflects India’s irrec-
oncilable protectionist politics.
On the WTO front, India applies MFN tariff rates of up to 150% to
support its domestic agriculture.101  In the ASEAN-India FTA, Indian agri-
www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/237761/ado-2017-highlights.pdf [https://
perma.cc/746E-6FCE].
95. See Kenneth Lim, Singapore a ‘Firm Believer’ in India: PM Lee, CHANNEL NEWS
ASIA (Oct. 4, 2016), http://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/singapore/singapore-a-
firm-believer-in-india-pm-lee-7740730; Kallol Bhattacherjee, Vietnam for Greater Indian
Role in SE Asia, THE HINDU (July 4, 2017), http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/
vietnam-asks-india-to-play-security-role-in-south-china-sea/article19210720.ece [https://
perma.cc/ZS4T-3K49].
96. See generally Avinash Nair, To Counter OBOR, India and Japan Propose Asia-Africa
Sea Corridor, INDIAN EXPRESS (May 31, 2017), http://indianexpress.com/article/
explained/to-counter-obor-india-and-japan-propose-asia-africa-sea-corridor-4681749/
[https://perma.cc/8RB9-LJGX].
97. See id.; HARDEEP S. PURI ET AL., ASIA AFRICA GROWTH CORRIDOR: PARTNERSHIP FOR
SUSTAINABLE AND INNOVATIVE DEVELOPMENT: A VISION STATEMENT 3– 6 (2017), available at
http://www.eria.org/Asia-Africa-Growth-Corridor-Document.pdf [https://perma.cc/
RE7H-EM6W].
98. India Selfishly Blocking RCEP Pact: Chinese Media, ECON. TIMES (Jan. 18, 2017),
http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/india-selfishly-block-
ing-rcep-pact-chinese-media/articleshow/56644605.cms [https://perma.cc/75DV-
HFBT].  The ASEAN-X formula, which had been discussed on a limited scale at RCEP
meetings, was proposed by the Philippines, the ASEAN Chair in 2017. See Pambagyo,
supra note 15, at 27; Catherine Pillas, Asean Minus X Formula to Fast-Track RCEP-PHL,
BUS. MIRROR (May 8, 2017), http://www.businessmirror.com.ph/asean-minus-x-
formula-to-fast-track-rcep-phl/ [https://perma.cc/ZH8Q-JWBP].
99. The single undertaking approach will lead to a single, comprehensive FTA that
covers core areas of goods, services and investment. See Amiti Sen, RCEP: India Gets
Trade Ministers on Board on ‘Single Undertaking’ for Goods, Services, HINDU BUS. LINE
(Nov. 7, 2016), http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/economy/rcep-india-gets-trade-
ministers-on-board-on-single-undertaking-for-goods-services/article9316063.ece
[https://perma.cc/2QRC-48R4].
100. Dezan Shira, India’s Free Trade Agreements, INDIA BRIEFING (Aug. 23, 2018),
https://www.india-briefing.com/news/indias-free-trade-agreements-4810.html/ [https:/
/perma.cc/D9RC-ND8C].
101. Report by the Secretariat, Trade Policy Review: India, WTO Doc. WT/TPR/S/313
(Apr. 28, 2015), at 99– 100.
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cultural projects are mostly immune to liberalization because they are
either excluded or scheduled under the sensitive track.102  India has been
the WTO forerunner for liberalizing labor mobility, known as Mode 4
within the definition of the General Agreement on Trade in Services
(GATS).103  This position facilitates the exportation of Indian professional
services in information technology (IT) and other areas.  As the ASEAN-
India FTA has exacerbated deficits in trade-in-goods without generating
sufficient services exports, the Modi government “will not repeat the mis-
take” in ASEAN-Indian negotiations.104  Hence, New Delhi demanded the
single-undertaking formula adopted for the AANZFTA, so that concessions
for tariff cuts will be tied to the potential gains for services market access.
As for controversial intellectual property (IP) provisions, the Indian
position conflicts with Japan’s and South Korea’s proposals that intend to
“TPP-nize” the RCEP standards.105  A key example is the protection of data
exclusivity under the TPP.  Article 18.50 of the TPP, which the CPTPP sus-
pended, exceeds the requirement of Article 39 of the WTO Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS).106  Pharma-
ceutical companies normally invest dramatically in developing clinical-trial
data.  For a fixed period of time, the TRIPS-plus protection obliges coun-
tries to prohibit such data from being utilized by subsequent manufactur-
ers for generic drugs.107  Data exclusivity would give a monopoly to
developed nations’ corporations and significantly undermine the granting
102. See Sally, supra note 84, at 356– 57 (analyzing the tariff elimination under the
ASEAN-India Framework Agreement and the Trade in Goods Agreements).
103. See e.g., Special Session of the Council for Trade in Services, Communication
from India: Proposed Liberalisation of Movement of Professionals Under General Agree-
ment on Trade in Services (GATS), WTO Doc. S/CSS/W/12 (Nov. 24, 2000); Special
Session of the Council for Trade in Services, Communication from Brazil, Colombia,
Dominican Republic, El Salvador, India, Indonesia, Nicaragua, The Philippines and
Thailand: Review of Progress in Negotiations, Including Pursuant to Paragraph 15 of the
Guidelines for Negotiations, WTO Doc. TN/S/W/23 (Sept. 29, 2004).
104. See Amiti Sen, India Pushes for Easy Visa for Professionals under RCEP, HINDU
BUS. LINE (Oct. 22, 2015), http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/economy/india-
pitches-for-market-access-for-professionals-in-rcep/article7792816.ece [https://
perma.cc/62F6-GYYT]; see also Blake Harley Berger, India, ASEAN, and RCEP: The Chal-
lenges of Negotiating a Services Pact, CTR. ON ASIA & GLOBALIZATION, CHINA-INDIA BRIEF
No. 71 (Mar. 8, 2016), https://lkyspp.nus.edu.sg/cag/publications/details/china-india-
brief-71 [https://perma.cc/DC8Z-XHXE] (“[The ASEAN-Indian] services pact as of 2016
has yet to be ratified by . . . Cambodia, Indonesia, and the Philippines, which is
extremely significant as Indonesia is India’s largest trading partner within ASEAN.”).
105. For the summary of Japan’s and South Korea’s requests for the RCEP intellectual
property provisions, see Belinda Townsend et. al., The Regional Comprehensive Economic
Partnership, Intellectual Property Protection, and Access to Medicines, 28 ASIA PAC. J. PUB.
HEALTH 682, 684 (2016).
106. See Trans-Pacific Partnership, Feb. 4, 2016, OFF. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, art.
18.50(1), available https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/TPP-Final-Text-Intellectual-Prop-
erty.pdf [https://perma.cc/7SCY-9UGY] [hereinafter TPP]; Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, art. 39(3), Apr. 15,1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M.
1197 (1994); for list of suspended provisions, see TPP Statement, supra note 9.
107. See Ellen R. Shaffer & Joseph E. Brenner, A Trade Agreement’s Impact on Access to
Generic Drugs, 28 HEALTH AFFAIRS w957, w959 (2009).
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of compulsory licenses for handling public health crises, including India’s
tuberculosis epidemic.108  The RCEP’s draft investment chapter that incor-
porates IP rights in the definition of investments eligible for ISDS further
fortifies India’s resistance.109  These issues illustrate India’s legal consider-
ations that may compromise RCEP commitments.
II. Key Components of RCEP Negotiations
By making interrelated theoretical and substantive claims, this Article
presents the NREO as the new normative framework for understanding
Third Regionalism.  Different from the NIEO that is preoccupied with the
North-South conflicts, the RCEP represents the NREO that facilitates
South-South FTAs.  The theoretical underpinning of the NREO is thus rein-
forced by the assertive legalism of the Global South in transforming the
dependency dilemma into active FTA policies.
Notably, the Guiding Principles have influenced the RCEP’s legal
structure.  First of all, de jure integration that replaces intra-RCEP trade
pacts is not intended.  Instead, the RCEP will improve five ASEAN+1 FTAs,
and it will not “detract from” commitments under existing FTAs.110  This
approach poses challenges to eliminating the noodle bowl syndrome of
Asian FTAs.  In addition, given “the different levels of development,” the
RCEP will allow for flexibility by incorporating SDT provisions.111  As
RCEP members accepted India’s request for adopting the single-undertak-
ing approach,112 the degree of policy space accorded to LDCs will be a
critical trade-off for partners to reach consensus.
Political complexity and capacity constraints have added further com-
plications to the RCEP.  As of 2017, RCEP negotiations were finalized for
the chapter on economic and technical cooperation and the chapter on
small and medium-sized enterprises.113  The core components that require
the “Grand Bargain” to involve trade in goods, trade in services and invest-
ment will determine whether the RCEP can be completed as the new
“ASEAN++” architecture by 2018.114  The increase from 60 to approxi-
108. See Data Exclusivity in International Trade Agreements: What Consequences for
Access to Medicines?, MSF Tehnical Brief (May 2004), available at https://
www.citizen.org/sites/default/files/dataexclusivitymay04.pdf [https://perma.cc/XMR6-
6QGC]; Jyotsna Singh, Proposed trade pact clause on intellectual property could endanger
India’s TB programme, TB ONLINE (Apr. 11, 2017), http://www.tbonline.info/posts/
2017/4/11/proposed-trade-pact-clause-intellectual-property-c/ [https://perma.cc/3D2E-
PLKB].
109. Based on the consolidated version dated Oct. 16, 2015. See also Townsend et.
al., supra note 105, at 690.
110. Guiding Principles, supra note 46, at princ. 2 & 5.
111. Id. at princ. 4.
112. See Sen, supra note 99.
113. See Joint Media Statement, The Third Regional Comprehensive Economic Part-
nership (RCEP) Intersessional Ministerial Meeting (May 2017), available at https://
asean.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/RCEP-3ISSL-MM-JMS-FINAL-22052017.pdf
[https://perma.cc/UW2N-HVKA].
114. See Sylvia Ostry, The Uruguay Round North-South Grand Bargain: Implications for
Future Negotiations, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: ESSAYS IN
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mately 732 negotiators from 16 countries illustrates the complexity of the
RCEP talks.115  The insertion of ongoing negotiation of the China-Japan-
South Korea FTA into RCEP negotiations made the dynamics more intri-
cate.116  Equally significant, certain governments’ limited capacity has hin-
dered officials from negotiating ROOs and trade facilitation in parallel
working group meetings.117  Another hindrance is that political issues,
which cause conflicts between trade liberalization and constitutional con-
straints, can only be handled at the ministerial level.118
Below I will analyze the legal implications for the RCEP’s critical areas.
From a comparative law perspective, the trade in goods issues are to be
discussed with uneven tariff concessions and low utilization rates of
ASEAN+1 FTAs, as well as the impact of the RCEP on fragmented ROOs.
Services commitments are to be discussed with constitutional challenges
and ASEAN’s legal structure of professional mobility.  By examining the
legal positions of Australia, China, India, Indonesia, and the EU, invest-
ment matters focus on the contentious investor-state arbitration
mechanisms.
A. Tariff Eliminations and the Rules of Origin
Tariff cuts are the most transparent aspect of trade liberalization.  The
existing analyses on tariff eliminations under ASEAN+1 FTAs often neglect
the drastic tariff reductions in the ASEAN Economic Community.  To
achieve the RCEP’s goal of “the high level of tariff liberalization” and con-
solidation of Asian FTAs, going beyond the tariff concessions under
ASEAN+1 FTAs, and the intra-ASEAN, ATIGA is paramount.119  A compari-
son of five external FTAs readily demonstrates that the AANZFTA is the
most liberalized FTA, achieving an average tariff elimination coverage of
95.7%.120  The result is by no means a surprise, given the developed nation
status of Australia and New Zealand and their progressive FTA trajectories.
In contrast, India’s conservative posture made the ASEAN-India the
HONOR OF ROBERT E. HUDEC 285, 285– 89 (Daniel L. M. Kennedy & James D. Southwick
eds., 2002) (illustrating the “Grand Bargain” negotiations); Fukunaga, supra note  60, at
107– 08 (explaining the ASEAN+1 and ASEAN++ frameworks).
115. See IMAN PAMBAGYO, RCEP: PROGRESS, CHALLENGES & OUTLOOK 6 (Mar. 22, 2017),
available at https://www.iseas.edu.sg/images/centres/asc/pdf/RCEPIman.pdf [https://
perma.cc/K468-J7HS] [hereinafter RCEP Slides]; Trade Ministers in Asia-Pacific to Gather
in RoK for RCEP Talks, VOICE OF VIETNAM (Oct. 24, 2017), http://english.vov.vn/econ-
omy/trade-ministers-in-asiapacific-to-gather-in-rok-for-rcep-talks-360918.vov [https://
perma.cc/D92P-9H8C]. See also Yonhap, Trade ministers in Asia-Pacific to gather for
RCEP talks, KOREA HERALD (Oct. 23, 2017), http://www.koreaherald.com/
view.php?ud=20171023000550 [https://perma.cc/U3JU-DX55].
116. See RCEP Slides, supra note 115, at 11.
117. See id. at 7 (observing that “same officials in charge of 2 or more WGs/SWGs
(i.e., ROO & CPTF)”).
118. There are three working levels at RCEP negotiations: working groups for techni-
cal issues, the Trade Negotiation Committee for policy/legislative issues and the minis-
ters for political/constitutional issues. Id. at 12.
119. See Guiding Principles, supra note 46, at 2.
120. Fukunaga & Isono, supra note 6, at 8.
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CIN\51-3\CIN303.txt unknown Seq: 23  8-FEB-19 14:48
2018 Against Populist Isolationism 705
lowest-level FTA, with 79.6% coverage.121  Under the ASEAN-India FTA,
the average coverage of ASEAN states exceeds 90%, but Indonesia’s tariff
liberalization is merely 48.7%.122  The AEC’s most noteworthy achieve-
ment is ASEAN-6 countries’ elimination of 99.7% of tariff lines while
CLMV countries’ aim to achieve phasing in the remaining duties for sensi-
tive products by 2018.123  Consequently, I propose that the AANZFTA, and
the ATIGA should serve as the bases for RCEP tariff commitments.
Streamlining tariff eliminations of India, Indonesia and CLMV coun-
tries would make the RCEP the model for South-based FTAs.  As evidenced
by the ASEAN-India FTA and the bilateral FTAs of Japan and South Korea
with ASEAN countries, agricultural trade liberalization is key to the
RCEP.124  The AANZFTA provides the best practices because it eliminated
tariffs on substantial agricultural products when the agreement took
effect.125  To be a comprehensive FTA, the RCEP’s breakthrough in agricul-
ture relies upon two key factors: tariff elimination timeframes and potential
market access.
The tariff phase-in periods, which extend to 18 years under the
ASEAN-Japan FTA and 30 years under the TPP,126 exemplify critical trade-
offs for the RCEP.  In terms of market access, Japan keep its TPP commit-
ment to raise its quota for Australian rice by linking it to the export of
Japanese vehicles.127  In 2016, India proposed a three-tiered tariff
approach that grants RCEP countries 42.5% to 80% tariff cuts, depending
121. Id.
122. Id.; see also Sanchita Basu Das & Masahiro Kawai, Introductory Overview: Trade
Regionalism in the Asia-Pacific: Developments and Future Challenges, in TRADE REGIONAL-
ISM IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC: DEVELOPMENTS AND FUTURE CHALLENGES 1, 9 (Sanchita Basu Das
& Masahiro Kawai eds., 2016).
123. See AEC BLUEPRINT 2015, supra note 53, at 7; AEC 2025 CSAP, supra note 85, at
2; see also ASEAN Trade in Goods Agreement, INVEST IN ASEAN, http://inves-
tasean.asean.org/index.php/page/view/asean-free-trade-area-agreements/view/757/
newsid/872/asean-trade-in-goods-agreement.html [https://perma.cc/3ET6-SAQF] (last
visited Nov. 5, 2018) (“Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar, and Viet Nam have reduced their
import duties to 0-5 percent on 98.86 percent of their tariff lines.”).
124. See Timothy E. Josling, Agriculture, in BILATERAL AND REGIONAL TRADE AGREE-
MENTS: COMMENTARY AND ANALYSIS 171, 194 (Simon Lester, Bryan Mercurio & Lorand
Bartels eds., 2015) (explaining Japan’s FTA with Thailand and the Philippines and South
Korea’s FTA with Thailand).
125. Tariff eliminations take place from 2010 to 2020. See Masahiro Kawai &
Ganeshan Wignaraja, Asian FTAs: Trends, Prospects, and Challenges 16 (Asian Dev. Bank,
ADB Economics Working Paper Series No. 226, 2010), https://www.adb.org/sites/
default/files/publication/28273/economics-wp226.pdf [https://perma.cc/664P-
ANLW]; OCED, OECD REVIEW OF AGRICULTURAL POLICIES: INDONESIA 192 (2012).
126. Urata, supra note 40, at 14.  Canada, Japan, and the United States are allowed to
eliminate tariffs in 12– 30 years under the TPP.  Matthias Helble, Salvaging the Trans-
Pacific Partnership: Building Blocks for Regional and Multilateral Trade Opening 10 (Asian
Dev. Bank Inst., ADBI Working Paper Series No. 695, 2017), https://www.adb.org/sites/
default/files/publication/234081/adbi-wp695.pdf [https://perma.cc/4XQ7-AWGP].
127. See TPP-11 outcomes at a Glance, DEP’T FOREIGN AFF. & TRADE (AUSTL.), https://
dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/not-yet-in-force/tpp-11/outcomes-documents/
Documents/tpp-11-outcomes-at-a-glance.pdf [https://perma.cc/3VJ4-2PUJ] (last visited
Oct. 9, 2018).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CIN\51-3\CIN303.txt unknown Seq: 24  8-FEB-19 14:48
706 Cornell International Law Journal Vol. 51
on three different categories.128  India’s motivation was their defensive
position on agriculture and the significant $52.7 billion dollar trade deficit
with China.129  New Delhi subsequently dropped the proposal due to
RCEP members’ objections and India’s reassessed gains in services and
investment under the pact.130
As the largest mega-regional initiative, the RCEP’s harmonization of
ASEAN+1 FTAs and the ATIGA impacts the businesses’ utilization of the
FTAs.  In comparison, NAFTA’s usage rate surpasses 60%, but the utiliza-
tion rate of Asian FTAs is only 28%.131  The strikingly low usage of
ASEAN+1 FTAs, such as 5.1% of the ASEAN-India FTA for exporters and
2.3% of the ASEAN-Japan FTA for importers,132 nullified the legal efforts
for preferential tariff treatment.  The most used ASEAN FTAs are the
ATIGA in exports and the ASEAN-China FTA in imports, with utilization
rates of only slightly above 30%.133  Conventional answers to this problem
are the limited access to FTA information, low preference margins com-
pared with MFN tariffs, and complex ROOs.134  An oft-neglected factor is
the expanded commitments of the Information Technology Agreement, a
plurilateral WTO agreement that eliminates tariffs on IT products.135  As
11 RCEP partners are parties to the Agreement, zero tariff treatment for
128. Asit Ranjan Mishra, India’s New Stance at RCEP May Benefit China, LIVEMINT
(Aug. 9, 2016), http://www.livemint.com/Politics/qGEPZqVoHO4U4YYvfBgCNP/
Indias-new-stance-at-RCEP-may-benefit-China.html [https://perma.cc/S5BQ-RTM4]
(“[India] proposed 80% tariff cuts to [ASEAN] countries, 65% to South Korea and Japan
and finally 42.5% tariff liberalization to China, Australia and New Zealand with which it
does not have free-trade agreements”).
129. See id.; Kavaljit Singh, India Changes Tack on RCEP Negotiations, BILATERALS.ORG
(Oct. 31, 2016), http://www.bilaterals.org/?india-changes-tack-on-rcep [https://
perma.cc/SS78-QK35].
130. See Singh, supra note 129.
131. JAIME DE MELO, DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE WORLD ECONOMY 280 (2015); see
MASAHIRO KAWAI & GANESHAN WIGNARAJA, Main Findings and Policy Implications, in ASIA’S
FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS: HOW IS BUSINESS RESPONDING? 33, 34 (2011). See also ECONO-
MIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, FTAS IN SOUTH-EAST ASIA: TOWARDS THE NEXT GENERATION 5– 6
(2014) (indicating that the average utilization rate of FTAs concluded by four selected
ASEAN countries is 26%).
132. Lili Yan Ing, Shujiro Urata & Yoshifumi Fukunaga, How Do Exports and Imports
Affect the Use of Free Trade Agreements? Firm-level Survey Evidence from Southeast Asia 7
(European Res. Inst. for ASEAN, ERIA Discussion Paper Series, 2016), http://
www.eria.org/ERIA-DP-2016-01.pdf [https://perma.cc/W49P-AXGL].
133. Id.  The usage of the ATIGA is presumably undermined by the uneven utilization
by ASEAN states. See Lili Yan Ing & Olivier Cadot, Facilitating ASEAN Trade in Goods 11
(European Res. Inst. for ASEAN, ERIA Discussion Paper Series, 2016), http://
www.eria.org/ERIA-DP-2016-20.pdf [https://perma.cc/L25X-NHK6].
134. See ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, supra note 131, at 7– 8, 14; KAWAI &
WIGNARAJA, supra note 129, at 39– 40.
135. One example is Philippine firms, see Ganeshan Wignaraja, Dorothea Lazaro &
Genevieve DeGuzman, FTAs and Philippine Business: Evidence from Transport, Food, and
Electronics Firms 4, 16– 18 (Asian Dev. Bank Inst., ADBI Working Paper Series No. 185,
2010), https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/53566/1/618027203.pdf [https://
perma.cc/7GDA-LNYC].
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electronic devices renders the use of FTAs redundant.136
Complex and distinct ROOs in overlapping Asian FTAs have contrib-
uted to the noodle bowl syndrome and inhibited FTA usage.  Built on the
ROO reform agenda in the AEC Blueprint 2025,137 the RCEP should con-
solidate the best practices of regional ROOs.  Change in Tariff Classifica-
tion (CTC) and Regional Value Content (RVC) are the most common ROOs
in ASEAN FTAs.138  While the former qualitatively assesses whether the
products are classified under tariff schedules different from original mater-
ials, the latter quantitatively examines whether the products meet the FTA
value-added thresholds.139
Failure to meet the ROOs would disqualify exporters from receiving
the certificate of origin for FTA preferences.140  The ATIGA and most
ASEAN+1 FTAs have adopted the flexible co-equal rule, which permits
ROOs to be satisfied by either the CTC or the RVC.141  The ASEAN-India
FTA is now the sole exception to the rule after the 2015 protocol to the
ASEAN-China FTA, which relaxed its ROO requirement to a CVC or RVC of
40%.142  In terms of the certificates of origin, all of the five ASEAN+1 FTAs
have permitted third-country invoicing and movement certificates, so that
exporters can manage foreign exchange risks and logistics operations.143
136. See Information Technology: Schedules of Concessions, WTO, https://
www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/inftec_e/itscheds_e.htm [https://perma.cc/K4WV-
XHSL] (last visited Nov. 5, 2018).
137. See AEC BLUEPRINT 2025, supra note 53, at 3; AEC 2025 CSAP, supra note 85, at
3.
138. See Das et. al., supra note 7, at 267; INAMA & SIM, supra note 53, at 41– 44 (pro-
viding a list of rules of origin in ASEAN FTAs); Fukunaga & Isono, supra note 6, at 12. R
139. See Jong Bum Kim, The Evolution of Preferential Rules of Origin in ASEAN RTAs: A
Guide to Multilateral Harmonization, 46 J. WORLD TRADE 1343, 1358– 59 (2012); INAMA
& SIM, supra note 54, at xvi– xvii.
140. See generally Rules of Origin and Why They Matter, EXPORT.GOV (Oct. 20, 2016),
https://www.export.gov/article?id=Rules-of-Origin-and-Why-they-Matter [https://
perma.cc/EA58-U57D].
141. The ATIGA’s rules of origin (ROO) are based on the rules of the ASEAN Free
Trade Area (AFTA).  In 2003, the AFTA Council changed ASEAN’s ROO, which was lim-
ited to the regional value content of 40%, to include the change in tariff classification.
See Joint Media Statement, The 17th Asian Free Trade Area (AFTA) Council ¶¶ 11– 12
(Sept. 2013), available at https://asean.org/?static_post=the-seventeenth-meeting-of-the-
asean-free-trade-area-afta-council-1-september-2003-phnom-penh-cambodia [https://
perma.cc/9YUP-ZDD7]; INAMA & SIM, supra note 54, at 27.
142. A Guide to Understanding the ASEAN-China Free Trade Area Upgrade, Ministry
Trade & Industry (Sing.) (Sept. 2016), https://www.mti.gov.sg/-/media/MTI/Legisla-
tion/Public-Consultations/2016/Guide-to-the-upgraded-ASEAN-China-Free-Trade-Area-
ACFTA/a-guide-to-understanding-the-acfta-upgrade-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/P7KQ-
KKAU ]; see also Kim, supra note 138, at 1361 (explaining the restrictiveness of the “RVC
35% and CTSH” rule under the ASEAN-India FTA).
143. See Kohei Shino, How Far Will Hong Kong’s Accession to ACFTA Impact its Trade in
Goods 12– 19 (European Inst. Res. of ASEAN, ERIA Discussion Paper Series, 2013) avail-
able at http://www.eria.org/ERIA-DP-2013-04.pdf [https://perma.cc/XRA2-AKSP] (pro-
viding the various certificates of origin in ASEAN FTAs); Erlinda M. Medalla & Maureen
Ane D. Rosellon, Rules of Origin in ASEAN+1 Free Trade Agreements and the Supply Chain
in East Asia, in ASEAN AND REGIONAL FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS 171, 180 (Christopher
Findlay ed., 2015).
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These evolved practices and harmonized ROOs provide the model for the
RCEP.
Additionally, the RCEP will consolidate the regional supply chain by
filling the ROO-gap among ASEAN FTAs.  To illustrate, Chinese automotive
companies plan to expand their operations in Thailand by assembling
completely knocked-down units imported from China and exporting final-
ized cars to Indonesia and Australia.144  The ROOs of the AANZFTA, the
ATIGA, and the ASEAN-China FTA apply a RVC of 40% for automotive
parts and vehicles.145  While the completed cars sold in ASEAN are entitled
to ATIGA or ASEAN-China FTA preferences, those exported to Australia
may be denied preferential tariffs under the AANZFTA.  The AANZFTA’s
‘cumulative provision’ creates a legal obstacle because it does not recognize
the value of the cars’ Chinese components for the RVC calculation.146  In
other words, the lack of a link between the ATIGA and ASEAN+1 FTAs
obstructs the needs of contemporary transactions.  Consequently, an
ASEAN+6 cumulative provision under the RCEP will consolidate ASEAN
FTAs and propel the paradigm change in Asian regionalism.
B. Services Liberalization and Professional Mobility
The significance of trade in services is no less than that of tariff elimi-
nations.  In Third Regionalism, financial and logistics services underpin
cross-border trade in goods.  The intimate correlation between the two
modes of trade is evidenced by a 10% growth in trade in services aug-
menting trade in goods by 6%.147  To implement the RCEP countries’ com-
mitments to the UN Sustainable Development Goals, trade in services is
essential so as to develop policy that eradicates poverty and increases
employment.148  Modernizing services will enable RCEP members, such as
144. See Hiroshi Kotani, China’s SAIC Motor to Make Thailand an Export Hub, NIKKEI
ASIAN REV. (May 17, 2017), https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/AC/China-s-SAIC-Motor-
to-make-Thailand-an-export-hub [https://perma.cc/8VA8-5FXB] (providing SAIC
Motor’s business plan as an example).
145. Erlinda M. Medalla & M. Supperamaniam, Suggested Rules of Origin Regime for
EAFTA 15 (Philippine Inst. for Dev. Studies, Discussion Paper Series No. 2008– 22,
2009); see generally Annex 2 (Product Specific Rules), as Amended by the First Protocol,
Agreement Establishing the ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand FTA (AANZFTA) 590– 91,
DEP’T OF FOREIGN AFF. & TRADE (Austl.), https://dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/in-force/
aanzfta/official-documents/Documents/annex-2-product-specific-rules-first-protocol.pdf
[https://perma.cc/U6J4-HTNT].
146. See Agreement Establishing the ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand Free Trade Area
ch. 3, art. 6, Feb. 27, 2009, [2010] N.Z.T.S. 1 [hereinafter AANZFTA]. See also Baldwin
& Kawai, supra note 38, at 18 (listing cumulative provisions in other ASEAN+1 FTAs).
Another important step is for the RCEP to clarify the roll-up concept in applying the
cumulative provision.  Article 54.2 of the ATIGA does not provide clear guidance. See
INAMA & SIM, supra note 54, at 22– 23. See also Report by Secretariat, Trade Policy
Review: Singapore, WTO Doc. WT/TPR/S/343 (June 7, 2016), at 20 (elaborating that the
EU-Singapore FTA permits “the sourcing from other ASEAN countries as originating
content” for selected products).
147. Juan Blyde & Natalia Sinyavskaya, The Impact of Liberalizing Trade in Services on
Trade in Goods: An Empirical Investigation, 11 REV. DEV. ECON. 566, 573 (2007).
148. The Sustainable Development Goals that took effect in 2016 were built upon
Millennium Development Goals that governed the development agenda from 2000 to
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Malaysia and Thailand, to escape from the “middle income trap” that stag-
nates the economy due to the eroding labor-intensive advantage.149  In
developing countries and LDCs, foreign direct investments (FDIs) are
increasingly associated with service providers that help buttress the wel-
fare of the poor through job creation.150  Labor mobility results in remit-
tances, which also benefit the Global South’s development.
The TPP’s unforeseen future and the fact that no ASEAN countries are
participating in the WTO Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA) negotiations
enable the RCEP to set the standards for Asian FTAs.151  Based on “the
GATS and ASEAN+1 FTAs,” the RCEP’s target is to “substantially elimi-
nate” barriers to services trade.152  To ensure ASEAN centrality, the RCEP
should take evolving AFAS commitments into account.  The AFAS’s “pack-
age” structure is similarly incorporated in ASEAN’s respective FTAs with
China and South Korea.153  ASEAN+1 FTAs, except for the ASEAN-Japan
FTA, cover services commitments.154  Although the 2014 ASEAN-India Ser-
vices Agreement is the latest services pact in external FTAs, its core com-
mitments in financial and transport services rarely exceed the WTO
level.155
Contrary to the conventional understanding that ASEAN states com-
mitted the most in the comprehensive AANZFTA, for the first time intra-
ASEAN commitments in the seventh package of AFAS commitments
exceeded those under the AANZFTA.156  Moreover, although the low
2015. See President of the General Assembly, Draft Outcome Document of the United
Nations Summit for the Adoption of the Post-2105 Development Agenda 3– 27, U.N. Doc. A/
69/L.85 (Aug. 12, 2015).
149. See Kenichi Ohno, The Middle Income Trap: Implications for Industrialization
Strategies in East Asia and Africa 93– 112 (GRIPS Dev. F., Policy Discussion Papers,
2008); Tran Van Tho, The Middle-Income Trap: Issues for Members of the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations 22– 29 (Asian Dev. Bank Inst., ADBI Working Paper Series No.
421, 2013), https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/156275/adbi-
wp421.pdf [https://perma.cc/P7QN-RP3Y].
150. See, e.g., Background Note by Secretariat, Council for Trade in Services: Mode 3 –
Commercial Presence, WTO Doc. S/C/W/314 (Apr. 7, 2010), at ¶ 24 (“[S]ervices
accounted for 65 per cent of developing economies’ inward FDI stock and for 86 per cent
of their outward FDI . . . .”) [hereinafter Mode 3].
151. See Sherry Stephenson, Alexandros Ragoussis & Jimena Sotelo, Implications of
the Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA) for Developing Countries 33 (German Dev. Inst.,
DIE Discussion Paper,  2016), https://www.die-gdi.de/uploads/media/DP_10.2016.pdf
[https://perma.cc/AB9D-56JS].
152. Guiding Principles, supra note 46, at sec. II.
153. See ASEAN-China Agreement, supra note 84, at arts. 23 & 27; Agreement on
Trade in Services of the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Coopera-
tion among the Governments of the Member Countries of the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations and the Republic of Korea, ASEAN-S. Kor., arts. 24 & 26, Nov. 21, 2007.
154. The ASEAN-Japan FTA has not included a services agreement.
155. For the analysis of services commitments made by India and ASEAN states, see
Report by Secretariat, Trade Policy Review Body: Factual Presentation: Agreement on Trade
in Services between India and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Services),
ASEAN-India, WTO Doc. WT/REG372/1 (Aug. 22, 2016), at arts. 3.22– 3.5 [hereinafter
WT/REG372/1].
156. See Fukunaga & Isono, supra note 6, at 16.  Although ASEAN states concluded
the ninth package of commitments under the ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services
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degree of the first package of commitments under the ASEAN-China FTA
suffers from “GATS-minus” situations, the second package has brought it
up to par with the ASEAN-Korea FTA.157  These developments exhibit that
AFAS commitments should form the benchmark for the RCEP.  The pack-
age structure could also prevent a repeat of the TPP and TTIP mistakes that
aimed to achieve high-standard services liberalization without an incre-
mental approach in light of protectionist politics.
With respect to the modality of services liberalization, the AFAS and
ASEAN+1 FTAs adopt the GATS-like positive list approach, whereas EU and
US FTAs, such as the TPP, employ the negative list approach.158  While the
positive list modality allows FTA partners to retain regulatory sovereignty
to schedule services commitments, the more aggressive negative list
approach will enhance transparency and cover newly developed ser-
vices.159  Remarkably, the China-South Korea FTA signals China’s first use
of the negative list approach and indicates its changing position in services
commitments.160  In the bilateral FTA, China and Australia scheduled their
commitments on positive and negative lists, respectively.161  However, Beij-
ing agreed to follow the negative list modality in the subsequent round of
negotiations.162
A different hybrid mechanism is included in the positive list-based
Malaysia-New Zealand FTA, under which Malaysia agreed to “commence re-
negotiation of the specific commitments” if it concludes an agreement on a
negative list with a third country.163  These dynamics and the collective
lobbying of four TiSA members influenced the RCEP to be negotiated
under an innovative positive list formula with “value added” compo-
(AFAS), the most current AFAS data are based on the eighth package of commitments.
See RCEP Slides, supra note 115, at 10; Hikari Ishido, Harmonization of Trade in Services
by APEC Members 8– 16 (Inst. of Developing Countries, IDE Discussion Paper No. 410,
2013).
157. See Yoshifumi Fukunaga & Hikari Ishido, Assessing the Progress of Services Liber-
alization in the ASEAN-China Free Trade Area (ACFTA) 3 (European Res. Inst. of ASEAN,
ERIA Discussion Paper Series, 2013), http://www.eria.org/ERIA-DP-2013-07.pdf
[https://perma.cc/PQ3R-TV37]; RCEP Slides, supra note 115, at 10.
158. See Martin Roy, Juan Marchetti & Hoe Lim, Services Liberalization in the New
Generation of Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs): How Much Further than the GATS?
10– 12 (WTO Econ. Res. and Stat. Division, Staff Working Paper, 2006), https://
www.wto.org/english/res_e/reser_e/ersd200607_e.pdf [https://perma.cc/T9KG-7KDC].
159. See Aaditya Mattoo & Pierre Sauve´, Services, in PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENT
POLICIES FOR DEVELOPMENT: A HANDBOOK 235, 251– 52 (Jean-Pierre Chauffour & Jean-
Christophe Maur eds., 2011).
160. See Heng Wang, The Challenges of China’s Recent FTA: An Anatomy of the China-
Korea FTA, 50 J. WORLD TRADE 417, 418 (2016) (“[I]t is the first time that China will
commit to conduct FTA negotiations on a negative list for services and investment.”).
161. See Report by Secretariat, Committee on Regional Trade Agreements: Factual Pres-
entation: Free Trade Agreement between Australia and China (Goods and Services), WTO
Doc. WT/REG369/1/Rev.1 (Nov. 14, 2016), at 24.
162. See Free Trade Agreement between the Government of Australia and the Govern-
ment of the People’s Republic of China, Austl.-China, art. 8.24(3), June 17, 2015 [herein-
after Australia-China FTA].
163. Malaysia-New Zealand Free Trade Agreement, Malay.-N.Z., art. 8.15(2), Oct. 26,
2009,; Report by Secretariat, Trade Policy Review, WTO Doc. WT/TPR/S/292 (Jan. 27,
2014), at 32.
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nents.164  This approach provides guidance for South-based regionalism
because it incorporates negative list advantages without overly compromis-
ing regulatory sovereignty.  New components include the “ratchet” that
imposes a standstill by disallowing future governments from adopting
more restrictive measures, as well as the MFN-forward design, which
requires a RCEP country to automatically extend any services concessions
under its prospective bilateral agreements to other RCEP members.165
As for substantive commitments, the RCEP will be modeled after the
GATS and the AFAS that cover four modes of the services trade: Mode 1
(cross-border supply), Mode 2 (consumption abroad), Mode 3 (commercial
presence), and Mode 4 (movement of natural persons or MNP).166
ASEAN+1 FTAs reflect the WTO trend.  Mode 2, which seldom involves
hard bargains, is most committed, whereas professional mobility under
Mode 4 is least committed.167  The existing literature rarely addresses the
potential constitutional challenges to services negotiations.  For example,
Article 12 of the Philippine Constitution and Article 33 of the Indonesian
Constitution mandate that natural resources be “owned by” or “controlled
by” the State.168  These provisions may outlaw the RCEP’s Mode 3 foreign
equity reforms in mining and forest sectors.  The Philippines’ constitu-
tional principle that confines professional practice to citizens equally chal-
lenges Mode 4 liberalization.169  The RCEP’s external pressure to remove
constitutional obstacles will similarly benefit ASEAN integration.
164. See Summary of Discussion, Ninth Meeting of the Regional Comprehensive Eco-
nomic Partnership Working Group on Trade in Services (9th RCEP– WGTIS) 3 (Aug.
2015), available at https://www.bilaterals.org/IMG/pdf/services_discussion_sum-
mary_9th_round.pdf [hereinafter RCEP Services Chapter]; JANE KELSEY, REGIONAL COM-
PREHENSIVE ECONOMIC PARTNERSHIP (RCEP) SERVICES CHAPTER: RISKS FOR DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES’ AND LDCS’ POLICY SPACE AND REGULATORY SOVEREIGNTY 2– 7 (2016), available
at https://rceplegal.files.wordpress.com/2016/08/jk-memo-on-rcep-tis-final.pdf [https:/
/perma.cc/DMS5-ATLE0].
165. See RCEP Services Chapter, supra note 164, at 3– 5; KELSEY, supra note 164, at
8– 9.
166. GATS, General Agreement on Trade in Services, art. 1, ¶ 2, Apr. 15, 1994, Mar-
rakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, 1869 U.N.T.S.
183, 33 I.L.M 1167 (1994).
167. Mode 3, supra note 150, at 17; Background Note by Secretariat, Council for Trade
in Services: Presence of Natural Persons (Mode 4), WTO Doc. S/C/W/301 (Sept. 15,
2009), at 20– 25; Ishido, supra note 155, at 24.
168. The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines 1987, art. XII, secs. 2 & 10;
The Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia 1945, art. 33(3).  For potential constitu-
tional interpretations, see Stephen L. Magiera, International Investment Agreements and
Investor-State Disputes: A Review and Evaluation for Indonesia 36 (European Res. Inst. of
ASEAN, ERIA Discussion Paper Series, 2017), http://www.eria.org/ERIA-DP-2016-
30.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZW8M-MK3P]; Ponciano S. Intal Jr., AEC Blueprint Implemen-
tation Performance and Challenges: Investment Liberalization 9, 17, (European Res. Inst.
of ASEAN, ERIA Discussion Paper Series, 2015), http://www.eria.org/ERIA-DP-2015-
32.pdf [https://perma.cc/D7FP-E3AG]).
169. Report by Secretariat, Trade Policy Review Body: The Philippines: Revision , WTO
Doc. WT/TPR/S/261/Rev.2 (May 9, 2012), at 95– 96; see also The Constitution of the
Republic of the Philippines 1987, art. XII, sec. 14 (“The practice of all professions in the
Philippines shall be limited to Filipino citizens, save in cases prescribed by law.”).
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In my view, to accelerate much-needed professional mobility in the
Asia-Pacific and refute the prevalent low-level contention, the RCEP should
be built upon the AEC’s Mode 4 commitments and mutual recognition
arrangements (MRAs).  This focus will create TPP-plus benefits for the
Global South.  Other than the poverty reduction effect of remittances, cir-
cular migration has brought back skills that modernize the economies of
the original countries.170  Despite the pro-development effect, the WTO’s
liberalization over the MNP was restrictive because of the concern about
creating the back door to immigration.171  This unfounded misconception
has also caused global protectionism.
In terms of Mode 4, US FTAs turned drastically conservative after Sin-
gapore and Chile FTAs allocated additional quotas for work visas.172
Among ASEAN+1 FTAs, the AANZFTA is the only one that includes an
MNP chapter.173  Even the most recent ASEAN-India Services Agreement
merely provides definitions of natural persons without substantive MNP
provisions.174  On the bilateral level, the most notable example is the move-
ment of nurses and care workers under Japan’s FTAs with four ASEAN
states.175  Nevertheless, limited sectors commitments as well as legal obsta-
cles, such as qualification and language requirements, have impeded the
intended results.176
The RCEP negotiators have discussed the possibility of including a
MNP chapter or annex.177  The AEC’s goal of facilitating the movement of
“skilled” labor rather than all “natural persons”178 could provide guidance
for the mega-regional agreement.  Under the AEC Blueprint 2025, the
170. See Simon Feeny & Mark McGillivray, The Role of ASEAN Connectivity in Reduc-
ing the Development Gap, in NARROWING THE DEVELOPMENT GAP IN ASEAN: DRIVERS AND
POLICY OPTIONS 84, 113 (Mark McGillivray & David Carpenter eds., 2013); Witada
Anukoonwattaka & Adam Heal, U.N. ECON. & SOCIAL COMM’N FOR ASIA AND THE PACIFIC,
REGIONAL INTEGRATION AND LABOUR MOBILITY LINKING TRADE, MIGRATION AND DEVELOP-
MENT 54– 55 (2014), https://www.unescap.org/sites/default/files/publications/STE
SCAP2688_No81.pdf [https://perma.cc/A7UC-DU7V].
171. See ASEAN, ASEAN INTEGRATION IN SERVICES 32 (2015), https://www.asean.org/
storage/2015/12/ASEAN-Integration-in-Services-(Dec%202015).pdf [https://perma.cc/
R5NF-U9AD ].
172. See Sherry Stephenson & Gary Hufbauer, Labor Mobility, in PREFERENTIAL TRADE
AGREEMENT POLICIES FOR DEVELOPMENT: A HANDBOOK 275, 281– 83 (Jean-Pierre Chauffour
& Jean-Christophe Maur eds., 2011).
173. See R.V. Anuradha, Liberalization of Trade in Services under RCEP: Mapping the
Key Issues, 8 ASIAN J. WTO & INT’L HEALTH L. & POL’Y 401, 409 (2013).
174. See WT/REG372/1, supra note 154, at 16.
175. While the Japan-Thailand FTA only provides a framework for future negotia-
tions, Japan’s FTAs with Indonesia, the Philippines and Vietnam include commitments
on nurses and caretakers. See Report by Secretariat, Trade Policy Review Body: Japan,
WTO Doc. WT/TPR/S/351 (Jan. 18, 2017), at 125– 27.
176. To gain better residency conditions, ASEAN workers that entered Japan under
FTAs are required to take examinations.  However, “[t]he rate of success . . . is around
35% for caretakers and slightly over 10% for nurses.” Id. at 126– 27.
177. See also RCEP Services Chapter, supra note 162, at 6 (noting that “ASEAN has no
consensus position on this issue yet” and “India had submitted a text for MNP”
previously).
178. See AEC BLUEPRINT 2025, supra note 53, at 5; see also ASEAN Agreement on the
Movement of Natural Persons, preamble (2012) [hereinafter ASEAN MNP Agreement].
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ASEAN MNP Agreement and MRAs liberalize professional mobility.179
The Agreement, which will supersede AFAS Mode 4 commitments, encom-
passes services trade on a non-permanent basis.  To avoid immigration
concerns, it resembles the GATS by excluding ASEAN governments’ “mea-
sures affecting natural persons seeking access to the employment market”
and “measures regarding citizenship, residence or employment on a perma-
nent basis.”180  In other words, the governments retain their regulatory
power to maintain visa requirements for public purposes, provided that
treaty benefits are not impaired.181
Furthermore, the implementation of ASEAN MRAs that cover eight
professions provide valuable experiences.182  Compared with APEC and
TPP’s soft-law schemes, the ASEAN pacts on engineering and architecture
services are most conspicuous.183  The regional-level professional institu-
tions and national regulatory bodies have created a three-step registration
process.  For instance, an engineer who meets the educational and experi-
ence requirements can be first certified by the domestic body, which sub-
mits the application to the ASEAN committee.184  Upon approval as an
“ASEAN Chartered Professional Engineer,” the engineer is qualified to
apply to be a foreign engineer in another ASEAN country.185
The ASEAN MRA on tourism professionals exemplifies a rare scheme
that facilitates “unregulated” services due to the absence of international
standards for tourism services providers.  The MRA not only created a
database to assist registered tourism professionals, but also consolidated
the regional tourism industry by developing competency standards for 32
job titles.186  ASEAN’s experiences in Mode 4 liberalization and MRAs are
integral to the RCEP, which aims to achieve “comprehensive” services com-
179. See AEC BLUEPRINT 2025, supra note 53, at 10; see also AEC 2025 CSAP, supra
note 84, at 11– 12.
180. ASEAN MNP Agreement, art. 2, ¶ 2, supra note 178.
181. Id. at art. 2, ¶ 3.
182. From 2005 to 2014, eight ASEAN mutual recognition arrangements (MRAs) were
concluded and apply to engineering, nursing, architectural, dental, medical, tourism and
accounting services. See DOVELYN RANNVEIG MENDOZA & GUNTUR SUGIYARTO, ASIAN DEV.
BANK, THE LONG ROAD AHEAD: STATUS REPORT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ASEAN
MUTUAL RECOGNITION ARRANGEMENTS ON PROFESSIONAL SERVICES 1 (2017).
183. TPP, supra note 106, at art. 10.9 & annex 10-A; see DOVELYN RANNVEIG MENDOZA
ET. AL., ASIAN DEV. BANK, REINVENTING MUTUAL RECOGNITION ARRANGEMENTS: LESSONS
FROM INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCES AND INSIGHTS FOR THE ASIAN REGION 34 (2017) (demon-
strating that only five architects registered under the APEC framework); ASEAN, ASEAN
INTEGRATION REPORT 2015 24 (2005) (“To date, there are a total of 1,252 engineers on the
ASEAN Chartered Professional Engineers Register and 284 architects on the ASEAN
Architect Register.”).
184. See ASEAN Mutual Recognition Arrangement on Engineering Services, art. 3
(2005).
185. Id.; Deunden Nikomborirak & Supunnavadee Jitdumrong, ASEAN Trade in Ser-
vices, in THE ASEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY: A WORK IN PROGRESS 95, 104– 05 (Sanchita
Basu Das et. al. eds., 2013).
186. A person who possesses a tourism certificate issued by a national agency in
compliance with MRA requirements can be recognized as a “Foreign Tourism Profes-
sional” in another ASEAN state. See ASEAN, ASEAN MUTUAL RECOGNITION ARRANGEMENT
(MRA) ON TOURISM PROFESSIONALS: HANDBOOK 1, 18 (2013).
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mitments.187  Given the procrastinated status of the TPP and the TiSA, the
AEC’s consolidation of commitments in the prospective ASEAN Trade in
Services Agreement will further prompt the RCEP to fortify services trade
in the Asia-Pacific.188
C. Investor-State Dispute Settlement
Trade in goods, trade in services, and investment form the cardinal
pillars of the RCEP.  Investment law and policy is critical to FDI inflows
that catalyze pro-poor development in the Global South.  Given the slowing
Chinese economy, ASEAN overtook China in attracting FDI for the first
time in 2013.189  Under the AEC Blueprint 2025, ASEAN will strengthen
the ACIA-based investment regime to enhance its regional competitive-
ness.190  As of 2017, ASEAN and other six countries agreed to expedite
bilateral or plurilateral negotiations, including investment liberalization,
on a request and offer basis.191
One should note that the signing of the ASEAN-India Investment
Agreement left the ASEAN-Japan FTA the sole ASEAN+1 FTA without an
investment component.192  RCEP negotiations on investment “promotion,
protection, facilitation and liberalization” are built upon the intra-ASEAN
ACIA and external ASEAN FTAs.193  Nevertheless, these instruments vary
in substantive provisions on covered investments, MFN and national treat-
ment, and compensation following expropriation.194  The most conten-
tious investment issue that may amount to a “deal breaker” are ISDS
provisions, which entitle foreign investors to sue host states in interna-
tional judicial bodies.  ISDS was initially designed to overcome the local
court bias and the hurdle for exercising diplomatic protection by investors’
home states in public international law.  The ICSID Convention crystalized
the multilateral efforts to adjudicate investor-state disputes under the aus-
pices of the World Bank.195  However, four RCEP members (India, Laos,
187. See Guiding Principles, supra note 46, at 2.
188. See AEC BLUEPRINT 2025, supra note 53, at 6 (“The next agenda is to [conclude]
the ASEAN Trade in Services Agreement (ATISA) as the legal instrument for further inte-
gration of services sectors in the region.”).
189. JUSTIN WOOD, ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, RE-DRAWING THE ASEAN MAP: HOW
COMPANIES ARE CRAFTING NEW STRATEGIES IN SOUTH-EAST ASIA  4 (2014).
190. AEC BLUEPRINT 2025, supra note 53, at 7.
191. ASEAN Economic Ministers to Step up RCEP negotiations, WTOCENTER: VCCI:
TRUNGTAMWTO (Sept. 11, 2017), http://wtocenter.vn/other-agreement/asean-eco-
nomic-ministers-step-rcep-negotiations; see also RCEP Slides, supra note 115, at 12.
192. Nonetheless, Japanese enterprises can resort to existing bilateral investment trea-
ties (BITs) or investment chapters of bilateral FTAs.  For investor-state dispute settlement
provisions in ASEAN+1 FTAs, see Magiera, supra note 167, at 27.
193. See Guiding Principles, supra note 46, at 2.
194. See Das et. al., supra note 7, at 271– 72. See generally Luke Nottage, The Invest-
ment Chapter and ISDS in the TPP: Lessons from Southeast Asia 15– 17 (Yusof Ishak Inst.,
ISEAS:Economics Working Paper No. 2017-2, 2017), https://www.iseas.edu.sg/images/
pdf/ISEAS_EWP_2017-02.pdf, [https://perma.cc/TV2J-2A3R].
195. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and
Nationals of Other States, the ICSID Convention was ratified by 154 states. INT’L CTR.
FOR SETTLEMENT OF INV. DISPUTES, LIST OF CONTRACTING STATES AND OTHER SIGNATORIES OF
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Myanmar and Vietnam) are not parties to the Convention.196
In line with the universal trend, Asian BITs and FTAs often include
ISDS provisions because they are perceived to incentivize investments.197
The ACIA and ASEAN+1 FTAs follow the modality of the US Model BIT
and the NAFTA, and go beyond earlier BITs by incorporating more detailed
arbitration procedures than the ICSID Convention.198  In reality, the
“ASEAN way” and the fear of undermining relations with governments
have deterred foreign investors from filing complaints against host states.
Yaung Chi Oo v. Myanmar remains the only case that arose from ASEAN
FTAs.199  Here, a Singaporean company challenged the Myanmar govern-
ment’s expropriation of a joint venture brewery, but the Tribunal dismissed
the case on jurisdictional grounds based on the interpretation of pre-ACIA
agreements.200
In Third Regionalism, the soaring number of investor-state disputes
has shaped the NREO and the stance of the Global South.  Since the 2000s,
reported ISDS cases have increased fivefold, and the number of Asian-
Pacific state respondents have doubled the number of those as claim-
ants.201  ISDS provisions have become the source of global protectionism
and underpin public criticism against FTAs.  They are perceived to be
undemocratic for permitting foreign corporations to bypass domestic
courts’ jurisdiction.  ISDS provisions are also criticized for creating a “regu-
latory chill” that makes public policy measures vulnerable to foreign inves-
tors’ legal challenges.
The case of Philip Morris v. Australia changed the landscape, and
THE CONVENTION (AS OF AUG. 27, 2018), https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/
icsiddocs/List%20of%20Contracting%20States%20and%20Other%20Signatories
%20of%20the%20Convention%20-%20Latest.pdf [https://perma.cc/6H2V-REH5].
196. Id. at 1– 5.
197. See ASIAN DEV. BANK, ASIAN ECONOMIC INTEGRATION REPORT 2016: WHAT DRIVES
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC? 166 (2016) (stating that such provi-
sions could “increase greenfield FDI projects into Asia by 28.5%”). Cf. Robert Howse,
International Investment Law and Arbitration: A Conceptual Framework 21– 22 (Inst. for
Int’l Law & Justice, IILJ Working Paper 2017/1 (MegReg Series), 2017), https://
www.iilj.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/Howse_IILJ_2017_1-MegaReg.pdf [https://
perma.cc/KK5G-RT2L].  Rare exceptions also exist in recent agreements, such as Austra-
lia’s FTAs with the United States and Japan, and the New Zealand-Taiwan FTA.
198. For the evolution of the ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement [ACIA]
and the AANZFTA, see Zewei Zhong, The ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement:
Realizing a Regional Community, 6 ASIAN J. COMP. L. 1, 4– 16 (2011); Amokura Kawharu
& Luck Nottage, Models for Investment Treaties in the Asian-Pacific Region: An Underview,
34 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 461, 501– 03 (2017).
199. Yaung Chi Oo Trading Pte Ltd. v. Government of the Union of Myanmar, ASEAN
I.D. Case No. ARB/01/1 (Mar. 31, 2003), 42 I.L.M. 540 (2003).
200. See id. at 540– 41, 556– 58.  The dispute involves the interpretations of pre-ACIA
investment agreements, such as the 1987 Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of
Investments (IGA) and the 1998 Framework Agreement on the ASEAN Investment Area
(AIA).
201. As of January 2017, there are 767 publicly known investor-state cases. U.N CON-
FERENCE ON TRADE AND DEV. (UNCTAD), INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT: REVIEW OF
DEVELOPMENTS IN 2016 1– 2(2017) [hereinafter ISDS review]; CARLOS KURIYAMA, APEC
POLICY SUPPORT UNIT, TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENT IN PROVISIONS AND OUTCOMES OF RTA/
FTAS IMPLEMENTED IN 2015 BY APEC ECONOMIES 30 (2016).
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resulted in the tobacco carve-out clause of the TPP’s ISDS provisions.202  In
this case, Philip Morris challenged Australia’s plain cigarette packaging leg-
islation that intended to reduce smoking.203  Although the Virginia-based
company was unable to resort to the Australia-US FTA, that did not include
ISDS— corporate restructuring entitled Philp Morris’s Hong Kong subsidi-
ary to sue Canberra under the Australia-Hong Kong BIT.204  In the Tribu-
nal’s view, “this arbitration constitutes an abuse of rights” because the
dispute was foreseeable to Phillip Morris at the time of the restructur-
ing.205  Despite the result, the case incurred public outcry, and fueled
states’ concerns about regulatory sovereignty and legal expenses.  The
direct response was that tobacco control measures were excluded from the
TPP.  This carve-out has also been adopted in the Australia-Singapore FTA
and will likely influence the RCEP’s ISDS design.206
In addition to Australia’s position, a compromise of RCEP stake-hold-
ing countries is of significance to the investor-state arbitration mechanisms
under FTAs in the Global South.  India and Indonesia are the most resis-
tant to “pro-investor” ISDS.  As the No. 1 ISDS target among RCEP coun-
tries, India has been the respondent in twenty-one disputes— the amount of
compensation that investors claimed reached $12.3 billion.207  For exam-
ple, the Dobhol power plant project dispute led US-based Enron, General
Electric, and Bechtel to file nine cases against India under various BITs.208
Other than “losing control” over its energy policy, India lost the case of
White Industries, in which an Australian company challenged delays in the
Indian judicial system.209  Based on the Australia-India BIT’s MFN clause,
the Tribunal held that New Delhi breached the obligation under its BIT
with Kuwait to ensure an “effective means of asserting claims and enforcing
202. See generally TPP, supra note 106, at art 29.5.
203. See Philip Morris Asia Ltd. v. Commonwealth of Austl., UNCITRAL, PCA Case
No. 2012– 12, Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, ¶ 7– 8, 89 (Dec. 17, 2015).
204. See id. ¶ 536– 70; Julien Chaisse & Shintaro Hamanaka, Understanding Asian
Investment Regime Complexity: What to Do About It?, 12– 13 (Inst. of Developing Econo-
mies, Japan External Trade Org., Discussion Paper No. 626, 2017); UNCTAD, INVESTOR-
STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT, supra note 201, at 15.
205. Phillip Morris Asia Ltd., supra note 203, ¶ 580– 85.
206. See Agreement to Amend the Singapore-Australia Free Trade Agreement, art. 22
Feb. 17, 2003, DEP’T OF FOREIGN AFF. & TRADE (Austl.), https://dfat.gov.au/trade/agree-
ments/in-force/safta/Documents/agreement-to-amend-the-singapore-australia-free-trade-
agreement.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z2NM-Y3FM] (stating that “[n]o claim may be brought
under this Section in respect of a tobacco control measure of a Party.”); Tania S.L. Voon,
Consolidating International Investment Law: The Mega-Regionals as a Pathway Towards
Multilateral Rules, 17 WORLD TRADE REV. 33, 57 (2018) (stating that the amendment was
“modelled on the TPP provision.”).
207. UNCTAD, INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT, supra note 201, at 1, 34; see also
CECILIA OLIVET ET. AL., THE HIDDEN COSTS OF RCEP AND CORPORATE TRADE DEALS IN ASIA
3– 6 (2016) (“India alone has been the target of 40% of the cases filed against RCEP
countries.”).
208. OLIVET ET AL., supra note 207, at 9– 10.
209. See White Industries Australia Limited v. India, UNCITRAL, Final Award, ¶
16.1.1 (Nov. 30, 2011).
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rights.”210  These incidences led India to redraft the Model BIT that signifi-
cantly limited access to ISDS by imposing a condition that required
exhaustion of local remedies.211  For similar policy reasons, Indonesia has
terminated more than 15 BITs since its government unilaterally abrogated
its BIT with the Netherlands in 2014.212  In other words, the ACIA,
ASEAN+1 FTAs and the RCEP will be the primary avenues by which for-
eign investors can utilize ISDS against Jakarta.
Contrary to India and Indonesia, South Korea and Japan are at the
forefront of ISDS proposals in RCEP negotiations.213  Their position in
“TPP-nizing” RCEP ISDS provisions is to ensure that their significant
investments in India and Southeast Asia are guaranteed.  Notably, China’s
evolving position on ISDS stands unique in the Global South.  While Beij-
ing’s “Westphalian fundamentalist” doctrine continues to apply to territo-
rial disputes in arbitration, it has revamped the ISDS strategy in tandem
with the increasingly active use of WTO disputes.214  For Beijing, invest-
ment arbitration benefits the OBOR initiative by protecting outbound Chi-
nese FDIs and can hardly undermine the communist leadership.  China’s
earlier BITs echo its 1993 reservation to the ICSID Convention that con-
fines the jurisdiction of a tribunal to “compensation resulting from expro-
priation and nationalization.”215  Nonetheless, the Australia-China FTA
remarkably expanded the ISDS application to cover violations of national
treatment obligations.216  Although Beijing has yet to push for ISDS provi-
sions vigorously, its changing practice will be critical to the RCEP.
210. Id.; for disputes involving most-favored-nation [MFN] clauses in BITs, see Adrian
M. Johnston & Michael J. Trebilcock, Fragmentation in International Trade Law: Insights
from the Global Investment Regime, 12 WORLD TRADE REV. 621, 643– 47 (2013).
211. See Model Text for the India Bilateral Investment Treaty ¶ 14.3, AFRICAN L. REP.
(2015),  http://jurisafrica.org/html/pdf_indian-bilateral-investment-treaty.pdf [https://
perma.cc/E2RX-99R8]. See also David M. Trubek & Sonia E. Rolland, Legal Innovation
in Investment Law: Rhetoric and Practice in Emerging Countries, 39 U. PA. J. INT’L L., 358,
367– 68 (2017) (comparing the 2003 and 2015 Model BITs and suggesting that the latter
focuses more on sovereignty and development).
212. See Magiera, supra note 167, at 4, 16.
213. See Belinda Townsend, Patricia Ranald & Deborah Gleeson, Update on the
Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership agreement— NGO Briefing, BILATERALS.ORG
(Sept. 14, 2015), http://bilaterals.org/spip.php?page=print-art&id_article=28479
[https://perma.cc/YP2R-ZJVE].
214. I learned of the term “Westphalian fundamentalist” from Professor James
Zhaojie Li of China’s Tsinghua University in May 2017.  China’s non-participation in the
South China Sea Arbitration is a key example.  As of August 2017, China has 20 WTO
cases as a complainant and 152 cases as a third party. See Disputes by Member, WTO,
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_by_country_e.htm (follow “Dis-
putes by Members” hyperlink) (last visited Nov. 10, 2018).
215. Contracting States and Measures Taken by Them for the Purpose of the Conven-
tion, ICSID/8-D(2018), https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/icsiddocs/ICSID
%208-Contracting%20States%20and%20Measures%20Taken%20by%20Them%20for
%20the%20Purpose%20of%20the%20Convention.pdf [https://perma.cc/YRL5-
WWFV]; see Jie (Jeanne) Huang, Silk Road Economic Belt: Can Old BITs Fulfil China’s New
Initiative? 50 J. WORLD TRADE 733, 751– 52 (2016).
216. In comparison, ISDS provisions do not apply to MFN treatment. See Australia-
China FTA, supra note 162, at arts. 1.2 & 1.3 .  China’s BITs in the late 1990s reflect the
same trend to widen the scope of ISDS. See also Vivienne Bath, “One Belt, One Road” and
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The US model of ISDS provisions has been the model for ASEAN
FTAs.  It was contended that the European model shaped the RCEP struc-
ture.217  This contention is problematic.  The EU’s proposal for creating a
multilateral investment court through the appellate mechanism in bilateral
FTAs has raised concerns about its practicability and implications for
developing countries.218  Given that the ICSID annulment proceedings are
confined to limited grounds, the appellate system aims to increase the par-
tiality, transparency and predictability of ISDS awards.219  Similar to the
TPP, the EU-Singapore FTA merely includes references to a potential appel-
late mechanism.220  Washington’s unclear stance, which has halted negoti-
ations of the TTIP, makes its “Appeal Tribunal” provisions futile.221  By far,
the EU only succeeded in incorporating its proposal in the FTAs with
Canada and Vietnam.222
The EU’s new trade policy is to evaluate the resumption of FTA negoti-
ations with Thailand and Malaysia and eventually conclude the ASEAN-EU
FTA.223  The RCEP negotiators should be advised that almost 70% of ISDS
cases against their countries were filed by European investors.224  The
potential result is that the EU could merely persuade less developed RCEP
countries to accept the appellate mechanism suggests the neocolonial rela-
tionship, which is what trade dependency theorists envisioned.  More fun-
damentally, the legal dispute that substantially delayed the ratification of
the EU-Singapore FTA has implications for ASEAN and the RCEP.  The
European Union Court of Justice addressed whether the EU was entitled to
have exclusive competence to include ISDS provisions in the FTA, and the
Chinese Investment, in LEGAL DIMENSIONS OF CHINA’S BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE 165, 177
(Lutz-Christian Wolff & Chao Xi eds., 2016).
217. See e.g., Luke Nottage, Towards a European Model for Investor-State Disputes?,
EAST ASIA F. (July 1, 2016), http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2016/07/01/towards-a-euro-
pean-model-for-investor-state-disputes/ [https://perma.cc/D8PT-ZSUD].
218. For the EU’s proposal, see Investment in TTIP and beyond— The Path for Reform,
European Council 1– 8 (concept paper, May 2015).
219. See id.; INT. CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT OF INV. DISP., CONVENTION, REGULATIONS AND
RULES 26– 27 (2006).
220. See TPP, supra note 106, at art. 9.23.11; Free Trade Agreement between the Euro-
pean Union and the Republic of Singapore, EU-Sing., art. 9.30.1(c), June 29, 2015 [here-
inafter EUSFTA].  For ISDS provisions of the EUSFTA, see Locknie Hsu, EU-ASEAN
Trade and Investment Relations with a Special Focus on Singapore, 6 EUR. Y.B. INT’L ECON.
L. 233, 245– 47 (2015).
221. See generally EUROPEAN UNION, PROPOSAL FOR INVESTMENT PROTECTION AND RESO-
LUTION OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES: TRANSATLANTIC TRADE AND INVESTMENT PARTNERSHIP:
TRADE IN SERVICES, INVESTMENT AND E-COMMERCE, art. 10 (2015).
222. See Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between Canada
and the European Union, Canada-E.U., art. 8.28, Oct. 28, 2016; Free Trade Agreement
between the European Union and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, E.U.-Viet., art. 28,
Feb. 1, 2015.
223. See Trade for All, supra note 36,  31– 32.
224. See Olivet et al., supra note 206, at 5 (“68% of investors suing RCEP countries are
based in [European countries, including the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and
France].”).
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Court ruled against the EU Commission.225  In the Court’s view, the ISDS
regime will remove disputes from domestic courts’ jurisdiction and hence
requires the consent of member states under the shared competence of EU
law.226  This decision would impose legal obstacles on the EU’s Asian
FTAs and limit the impact of the ISDS proposal on the RCEP.
III. The Systemic Impact on Regional and Multilateral Trading
Systems
This Article sheds light on the theoretical underpinning of the NREO,
which explains the legal strategies of ASEAN, China and India to pursue
the RCEP.  The discussion of the core elements of the RCEP buttresses the
corollaries of the new dependency theory that the assertive legalism of the
Global South can change its economic and development trajectory.  The
RCEP will invigorate paradigm changes in Asian FTAs and constitute a nor-
mative foundation for the Global South in world trade law.
Notably, the implementation of the AEC and ASEAN+1 FTAs provides
the joint impetus for the goals of the AEC Blueprint 2025 and the RCEP.
The critical and systemic issues in Third Regionalism include normative
conflicts of trade fragmentation.  Jurisdictional clashes under overlapping
agreements inevitably require scrutiny of WTO and VCLT case law.
Equally critical matters involve the RCEP’s nexus with the APEC-based
FTAAP and the pro-development operative mechanism of the 16-country
mega-FTA.  These issues are of great significance to enhance the contribu-
tions of Global South powers to resist populist isolationism and reinvigo-
rate the multilateral trading system.
A. Normative Conflicts of Trade Fragmentation
The 16-country RCEP will face new dynamics of trade fragmentation
in international economic law, as the mega-FTA could further complicate
the noodle bowl syndrome due to overlapping FTAs and BITs.  The RCEP’s
consolidation of intra-RCEP trade and investment pacts could immensely
benefit developing nations and the Doha Round.  Three types of normative
conflicts amid fragmented trade rules have emerged in Third Regionalism
and complicated the application of WTO law and the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties.
First, the conventional phenomenon arises from the jurisdictional
clashes between the WTO and FTAs.  In Mexico– Soft Drinks, Mexico’s
defense relied on the NAFTA’s forum exclusion clause when the United
States brought a WTO complaint against Mexico’s tax measures.227  Mex-
ico argued that, because the case constituted part of “a broader dispute” it
225. The interpretation concerns the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union. See Opinion Pursuant to Article 218(11) TFEU, Opinion 2/15 of the Court,
EU:C:2017:376, 2007, ¶¶ 3– 11, 305.
226. Id. ¶¶ 288– 93.
227. See Appellate Body Report, Mexico— Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other Bev-
erages, ¶ 42, WTO Doc. WT/DS308/AB/R (adopted Mar. 24, 2006).
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had previously brought against Washington in NAFTA proceedings, the
forum exclusion clause required NAFTA to be the sole forum for the
case.228  The Appellate Body held that a panel’s declining its own jurisdic-
tion would “diminish” a complaining party’s right under the Dispute Settle-
ment Understanding (DSU).229  The Appellate Body further elaborated
that although “legal impediments” may exclude the WTO’s jurisdiction,
such impediments did not exist in the present case.230
In a more recent case, Peru– Agricultural Products, Guatemala chal-
lenged the consistency of Peru’s Price Range System with the Agreement on
Agriculture and the GATT.231  Peru contended that Guatemala violated
“good faith” obligations under the DSU, as Guatemala waived the right to
bring the WTO complaint under their bilateral FTA.232  After scrutinizing
paragraph 9 of Annex 2.3 of the FTA, the Appellate Body ruled that a
waiver to relinquish DSU rights “must be made clearly” and “cannot be
lightly assumed.”233  In other words, such provisions do not constitute the
“legal impediments” that the Appellate Body explained in Mexico– Soft
Drinks.234  Thus, based on WTO jurisprudence, even if the RCEP does not
incorporate the “supremacy clause” that prioritizes the WTO Agreement, a
forum exclusion clause can hardly be interpreted to bar the WTO’s
jurisdiction.235
Second, emerging FTA-FTA conflicts have arisen in tandem with pro-
liferating trade pacts in Third Regionalism.  FTAs with overlapping geo-
graphical scopes led to more complex issues than the noodle bowl
syndrome caused by divergent ROOs.  For example, other than the WTO,
Singapore could bring an identical complaint against China under the
bilateral FTA, the ASEAN-China FTA or the RCEP.  Forum shopping is a
legal challenge.  In practice, de jure consolidation that enables a wider FTA
to terminate intra-FTAs is an ideal yet a politically sensitive exercise.  A rare
example is the Commonwealth of Independent States Free Trade Area that
228. See North American Free Trade Agreement, Can.-Mex.-U.S., art. 2005.6, Dec. 17,
1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993). See also Appellate Body Report supra note 227, ¶¶ 42, 54.
229. Id. ¶¶ 46, 48– 53.
230. Id. ¶ 54.
231. See Appellate Body Report, Peru— Additional Duty on Imports of Certain Agricul-
tural Products, ¶ 4.1, WTO Doc. WT/DS457/AB/R (adopted July 31, 2015).
232. Peru’s argument was based on Articles 3.7 and 3.10 of the Dispute Settlement
Understanding. See id. at ¶ 5.19 (“Peru alleges that Guatemala . . . acted contrary to
good faith . . . obligations under Articles 3.7 and 3.10 of the DSU.”).
233. Id. ¶ 5.25.
234. See id. at 21, n.106 (“[W]e do not consider that Members may relinquish their
rights and obligations under the DSU beyond the settlement of specific disputes.”).  For
further discussion on similar cases and forum shopping issues, see generally Joost
Pauwelyn & Luiz Eduardo Salles, Forum Shopping Before International Tribunals: (Real)
Concerns, (Im)Possible Solutions, 42 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 77 (2009).
235. See Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Partnership among Member States
of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and Japan, ASEAN-Japan, art. 10.3 (Apr.
14, 2008) (“[T]he WTO Agreement shall prevail to the extent of the inconsistency.”)
[hereinafter AJFTA].
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declared six bilateral FTAs “null and void” in 2012.236  During TPP negoti-
ations, Australia, New Zealand and Singapore argued for the “clean slate”
approach to supersede intra-TPP pacts.237  On the contrary, the United
States vigorously opposed the proposal in order to keep its existing market
access commitments under bilateral FTAs, such as FTAs with Australia and
South Korea.238  The end result is the TPP provision that merely allows the
FTA “to coexist with” other agreements.239
A cursory overview of the Guiding Principles for the RCEP suggests
the same coexistence approach to ASEAN+1 FTAs.240  Nevertheless, the
diversity of treaty language reveals more intricate interpretations than the
TPP.  In their “relations to other agreement[ ]” provisions, the AANZFTA
and the ASEAN-Japan FTA follow the three-phase approach that intra-RCEP
bilateral FTAs adopted.241  Substantively, “[e]ach Party reaffirms its rights
and obligations under” existing agreements to which they are parties.242
The ASEAN+1 FTA should not “be construed to derogate from” existing
obligations arising from other agreements.243  Procedurally, a party “shall
immediately consult with” another party should inconsistency between
ASEAN+1 FTAs and other agreements materialize.244
The ASEAN-Japan FTA endorses parallelism of FTAs by stressing the
validity of a separate agreement between parties if it provides more
favorable treatment.245  The “more favorable” assessment can be quantita-
tively determined if a single-issue dispute involves tariffs or a given mode
of services trade.  However, multi-issue cases can complicate the qualitative
application of the “more favorable” proviso.246  The Korea-Vietnam FTA
that identifies “more favorable treatment of goods, services, investments, or
persons” is an attempt to provide higher certainty and could be a basis for
236. Notification by the Russian Federation, WTO Doc. WT/REG/GEN/N/8 (March
28, 2016); see also U.N. ECON. & SOCIAL COMM. ASIA & PACIFIC, ASIA-PACIFIC TRADE AND
INVESTMENT REPORT 2016: RECENT TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS, at 101, U.N. Doc. ST/
ESCAP/2760, U.N. Sales No. E.16.II.F.23 (2016).
237. Deborah K. Elms & C.L. Lim, An Overview and Snapshot of the TPP Negotiations,
in THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP: A QUEST FOR A TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY TRADE AGREE-
MENT 21, 37 (Deborah Elms et al. eds., 2012).
238. See id.
239. See TPP, supra note 106, at art. 1.2.1; Elms & Lim, supra note 236, at 37 (stating
that in 2010, the parties to the TPP “essentially decided not to decide.”).
240. See Guiding Principles, supra note 46, princ. 5 (stipulating that ASEAN+1 FTAs
and intra-RCEP FTAs “will continue to exist”).
241. E.g., AANZFTA, supra note 146, at ch. 18., arts. 2.1– 2.3; AJFTA, supra note 235,
at arts. 10.2 & 10.4; Australia-China FTA, supra note 162, at art. 1.2., ¶¶ 1– 3.
242. E.g., AANZFTA, supra note 146, at ch. 18., art. 2.1.
243. Id. at ch. 18., art. 2.2.
244. Id. at ch. 18., art. 2.3.
245. See AJFTA, supra note 235, at art. 10.2.
246. See Chang-fa Lo, Coordinating Approach to Resolve Normative and Operational
Conflicts between Inner and Outer-FTAs, 50 J. WORLD TRADE 147, 157– 58 (2016)
(explaining the interpretations of the “more favorable treatment” in the Australia-Japan
FTA).
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the RCEP to detail the conditions.247
Certain intra-RCEP FTAs, evidenced by the ASEAN-Japan FTA and the
China-New Zealand FTA, assume the interpretative role of “international
law” to resolve treaty inconsistencies.248  Article 30 of the VCLT provides
the authoritative guide on “successive treaties relating to the same subject-
matter.”249  The overlapping rights and obligations under the RCEP,
ASEAN+1 FTAs, and bilateral FTAs fall within the ambit of Article 30.  Pre-
sumably, the les posterior rule codified in Article 30.3 applies to ASEAN+1
FTAs’ three-phase approach, under which “the earlier treaty applies only to
the extent that” it is “compatible with” the subsequent treaty.250  Neverthe-
less, a lex specialis argument may exclude the application of Article 30.3
because the FTAs’ three-phase provisions can be interpreted as a special
law that prevails over the general VCLT rule.251  But even if the argument
fails, applying Article 30.3’s later-in-time rule still runs into obstacles akin
to those raised under the “more favorable” provisions because of the “com-
patibility” assessment in multi-issue claims.
Finally, modern FTAs that incorporate investment chapters may con-
flict with coexistent BITs in investment-related disputes.  Applying the
VCLT in the overlapping FTA-BIT context involves different jurisdictional
disputes.  ISDS mechanisms in FTAs and BITs with inconsistent scopes and
carve-outs make operating Article 30.3 difficult.252 Yaung Chi Oo v.
Myanmar, which concerned the 1987 and 1998 intra-ASEAN investment
agreements, exemplified ASEAN jurisprudence on successive treaties.253
The Tribunal believed that the two disputed agreements had different
scopes of investment, and the ASEAN states had no intention to merge
them.254  Article 12 of the 1998 agreement stipulates that it “shall prevail”
247. Free Trade Agreement between the Government of the Socialist Republic of Viet-
nam and the Government of the Republic of Korea, Viet.-S. Korea, art. 1.3.2, Dec. 20,
2015.
248. AJFTA, supra note 235, at art. 10.4; see also Free Trade Agreement between the
Government of New Zealand and the Government of the People’s Republic of China,
China-N.Z., art. 3.2, Apr. 7, 2008.
249. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 30.3, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter VCLT].  Article 30.2 is inapplicable because almost none of
these agreements include “it is subject to” provisions.
250. Article of 30.3 of the VCLT reflects the later-in-time rule. See id.  See also Alexan-
der Orakhelashvili, Article 30 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: Appli-
cation of the Successive Treaties Relating to the Same Subject-Matter, 31 ICSID REV. 344,
361 (2016) (“[T]o what extent the lex posterior rule stated in Article 30 VCLT would be
applied in arbitral practice is not certain . . . .”).
251. This argument, which was raised in the context of the co-existence of the Austra-
lia-China FTA and BIT, also applies to the FTA-FTA conflicts. See Tania Voon & Eliza-
beth Sheargold, Australia, China and the Co-Existence of Successive International
Investment Agreements, in THE CHINA-AUSTRALIA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT: A 21ST CENTURY
MODEL 215, 228 (Colin B. Picker, Heng Wang & Weihuan Zhou eds., 2017) (discussing
Article 1.2.2 of the China-Australia FTA).
252. For detailed comparisons of FTAs and BITs, see id. at 217– 18; see also Jean Ho,
Investment Protection under Successive Treaties, 32 ICSID REV. 58, 68– 82 (2017).
253. Yaung Chi Oo Trading Pte Ltd., supra note 199, ¶¶ 76– 78.
254. See id. ¶¶ 77, 82.
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if it “provides for better and enhanced provisions.”255  According to “the
general practice of ASEAN with respect to successive agreements,” the Tri-
bunal held that Article 12 should not be interpreted to amend the 1987
agreement because the two pacts “are clearly intended to operate sepa-
rately.”256  This decision similarly exemplifies the difficulty of applying
Article 30.3 of the VCLT in practice.
RCEP negotiators should be aware that, similar to FTA-FTA scenarios,
parties rarely use de jure consolidation to resolve FTA-BIT conflict.  Article
9.10 of the EU-Singapore FTA, which will terminate 12 BITs between EU
states and Singapore, illustrates this approach.257  The China-Singapore
FTA (CSFTA) utilizes a different type of de jure consolidation; it incorpo-
rates a wider-FTA’s investment obligation.258  Without its own investment
provisions, the CSFTA makes the ASEAN-China Investment Agreement
under the ASEAN-China FTA “an integral part of” the CSFTA.259
Because the Investment Agreement alone provides the ISDS mecha-
nism, no jurisdiction conflict exists with the CSFTA.  Yet, legal issues may
relate to the China-Singapore BIT, which continues to be an effective paral-
lel with the CSFTA.  The 1985 BIT limits ISDS to “the amount of compensa-
tion” and confines the forum to “arbitral tribunals established by both
parties.”260  A party may well resort to the CSFTA for additional procedu-
ral guarantees.  In this regard, more detailed provisions under the CSFTA
facilitate de facto FTA-BIT consolidation.  This approach could enable the
RCEP to minimize normative trade fragmentation conflicts.
B. The RCEP as the Pathway to the FTAAP
The unsettled path of the TPP and the TTIP amid populist isolation-
ism made the RCEP’s status unique.  Reinforcing the NREO argument
requires an understanding of the RCEP as the pathway to the AEPC-envi-
255. Id. ¶ 79.
256. Id. ¶¶ 556– 57.
257. See EUSFTA, supra note 219, at art. 9.10.1 & Annex 9-D.
258. See Wolfgang Alschner, Regionalism and Overlap in Investment Treaty Law:
Towards Consolidation or Contradiction, 17 J. INT’L ECON. L. 271, 282– 84 (2014) (elabo-
rating de facto consolidation).  The author categorizes the China-Singapore FTA as an
example of de facto consolidation.  I hold a different view. De jure consolidation should
constitute any formal legal approach to enabling one of the two or more co-existing
agreements that govern the relations between the parties. De facto consolidation on the
other hand should constitute any approach that achieves the same result but without a
legal mechanism.
259. Free Trade Agreement between the Government of the People’s Republic of
China and the Government of the Republic of Singapore, China-Sing., art. 84.1, Jan. 1,
2009 [hereinafter CSFTA].
260. China and Singapore Agreement on the Promotion and Protection of Investment,
art. 13.3, Nov. 21, 1985, 1443 U.N.T.S. 293.  In comparison, Article 14 of the ASEAN-
China Investment Agreement has more detailed provisions on investment disputes. See
Agreement on Investment of the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic
Cooperation between the People’s Republic of China and the Association of Southeast
Asian, ASEAN-China, art. 14, Aug. 15, 2009.  Article 112 of the CSFTA simply affirms
parties’ “existing rights and obligations” and does not stipulate the application of the
FTA and the BIT.  CSFTA, supra note 259, at art. 112.
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sioned FTAAP in Third Regionalism.  This analysis not only fills the much-
needed gap in the existing literature, but it also helps revitalize the Doha
Round.  APEC currently has 12 representatives in the RCEP, which facili-
tates APEC’s Bogor Goals— to accomplish Asia-Pacific trade and investment
liberalization by 2020.261  APEC’s nature as a soft-law institution is dis-
tinct from FTAs that impose hard-law obligations.  To minimize “sovereign
costs,” APEC’s operating basis neither involves the treaty-ratification pro-
cess nor incurs trade retaliation from pacta sunt servanda rule viola-
tions.262  The voluntary foundation helped bypass the trade politics of
regionalism, but it also caused APEC’s institutional weaknesses, further
marginalizing its role.
In light of proliferating FTAs, the APEC Business Advisory Council
propounded the 21-party FTAAP in 2004 to reinvigorate APEC.263  After
APEC adopted the FTAAP vision in 2006, the 2010 APEC Leaders’ Declara-
tion identified “ASEAN+3, ASEAN+6, and the Trans-Pacific Partnership” as
pathways to a comprehensive trade pact.264  Optimism about the TPP fol-
lowed from the Obama administration’s engagement in P-4 agreement-
based TPP negotiations in late 2009.265  Notably, the “ASEAN plus”
frameworks that “codified” China and Japan’s EAFTA and CEPEA propos-
als were distinct from the RCEP framework, which underpins ASEAN
centrality.
To enrich the existing literature that only focuses on the TPP-FTAAP
nexus, I offer an analysis advocating for the RCEP as a more feasible path-
way to the FTAAP.  The RCEP first appeared in the Annex on the 2014
Beijing Roadmap, in which APEC declared that “the possible pathways to
the FTAAP” encompass the TPP and the RCEP.266  The US-China rivalry
led to the delicate language.  Beijing argued vigorously for the FTAAP when
it hosted the APEC meetings.267  Washington opposed the proposal due to
261. See APEC 2016– 17, supra note 10, at 53; see also 1994 Leaders’ Declaration,
supra note 39, ¶ 6.2.
262. For a discussion on the soft-law concept, see Chris Brummer, Why Soft Law
Dominates International Finance— and Not Trade, 13 J. INT’L ECON. L. 623, 631– 33
(2010); see also Harmut Hillgenberg, A Fresh Look at Soft Law, 10 EUR. J. INT’L L. 500,
509 (1999).
263. See APEC News Release, Asia Pacific Business Leaders to Press APEC Leaders to
Accelerate Regional Economic Integration (Feb. 14, 2014) (on file with author), at 1.
264. See id.; APEC Economic Leaders’ Declaration, ASIA-PACIFIC ECON. COOPERATION
(Nov. 13, 2010), https://www.apec.org/Meeting-Papers/Leaders-Declarations/2010/
2010_aelm [https://perma.cc/8FYD-CDY2].
265. The P-4 (Pacific 4) agreement, which was concluded in 2006 between Singapore,
New Zealand, Chile, and Brunei, preceded the TPP. See Fergusson & Williams, supra
note 34, at 1.
266. APEC Economic Leaders’ Declaration, Annex A— The Beijing Roadmap for
APEC’s Contribution to the Realization of the FTAAP, ASIA-PACIFIC ECON. COOPERATION
(Nov. 17, 2014), https://www.apec.org/Meeting-Papers/Leaders-Declarations/2014/
2014_aelm/2014_aelm_annexa.aspx [https://perma.cc/9L3J-4WAU] [hereinafter Beij-
ing Roadmap].
267. See Patrick Low, Beijing Must Take a Different Route with the US to Realise FTAAP
Goals, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Nov. 13, 2014), http://www.scmp.com/business/econ-
omy/article/1637967/beijing-must-take-different-route-us-realise-ftaap-goals [https://
perma.cc/2TMX-K6BT].
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concerns about detracting from the TPP and impairing the “pivot to Asia”
strategy.268  The eventual compromise aimed to revitalize the FTAAP
under the auspices of China by pursuing APEC’s two-year Collective Strate-
gic Study.269  Markedly, APEC urged “the early completion of” RCEP nego-
tiations in 2015.270  In the following year, APEC leaders endorsed the
FTAAP Study that stresses the RCEP’s substantial impact on “the economic
landscape of the region and the global economy.”271  APEC has thus placed
the RCEP on par with the TPP as integral to the FTAAP roadmap, which
could rejuvenate the stalled Doha Round negotiations.
The US withdrew from the TPP and thus diverted the status of the TPP
vis-a`-vis the RCEP.  Article 30.5 of the TPP only executes if countries that
account for 85% of the combined GDP “of the original signatories”
approve, thus making US membership indispensable.272  The revision to
this provision is a procedural hurdle for the remaining 11 TPP countries to
overcome under the CPTPP.  Substantively, it is contentious whether coun-
tries could retain the scope of concessions without having market access to
the United States.  For instance, the CPTPP’s list of suspended provisions
evidence Canada’s cultural exception request and Vietnam’s concerns
about its IP and labor rights commitments.273  With Australia’s and Mex-
ico’s support, Japan became the driving force for the CPTPP.274  Nonethe-
268. See id.; Shannon Tiezzi, US Pressures China to Kill Asia-Pacific Free Trade Agree-
ment Talks, DIPLOMAT (Nov. 4, 2014), http://thediplomat.com/2014/11/us-pressures-
china-to-kill-asia-pacific-free-trade-agreement-talks/ [https://perma.cc/7Y4T-Q9FR].
269. See APEC Economic Leaders’ Declaration, ASIA-PACIFIC ECON. COOPERATION (Nov.
11, 2014), https://www.apec.org/Meeting-Papers/Leaders-Declarations/2014/
2014_aelm [https://perma.cc/9ZMG-8KFG](“We agree to launch a collective strategic
study on . . . the FTAAP, and instruct officials to undertake the study, consult stakehold-
ers and report the result by the end of 2016.”).
270. APEC Economic Leaders’ Declaration, ASIA-PACIFIC ECON. COOPERATION (Nov. 19,
2015), https://www.apec.org/Meeting-Papers/Leaders-Declarations/2015/2015_aelm
[https://perma.cc/2LE2-XUU4].
271. See APEC Economic Leaders’ Declaration, ASIA-PACIFIC ECON. COOPERATION (Nov.
20, 2016), https://www.apec.org/Meeting-Papers/Leaders-Declarations/2016/
2016_aelm [https://perma.cc/JA24-A4UM] (“[W]e endorse the Recommendations of the
Study as the Lima Declaration on FTAAP.”).  In contrast, in the Study’s assessment of
the TPP, it merely states the TPP’s signature and entry into force issues without “prais-
ing” its potential effect. ASIA-PACIFIC ECON. COOPERATION, COLLECTIVE STRATEGIC STUDY
ON ISSUES RELATED TO THE REALIZATION OF THE FTAAP 166, 170 (2016).
272. TPP, supra note 106, at art. 30.5.2.  US GDP alone constitutes 65.2% of the com-
bined GDP of original TPP 12 countries.  Marina Tsirbas et al., supra note 3, at 14.
273. See Annex II –  List of Suspended Provisions, GLOBAL AFF. CANADA (last modified
Nov. 10, 2017), available at http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/trade-
agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/cptpp-ptpgp/annex2-annexe2.aspx?lang=Eng
[https://perma.cc/8SU3-36QX]; Vietnam Proposes Amendments to Stalled TPP Trade Deal
at Sydney Talks: Sources, BILATERALS.ORG (Aug. 29, 2017), http://bilaterals.org/?vietnam-
proposes-amendments-to&lang=En [https://perma.cc/5VEE-T73Q].
274. See Walter Sim, Australia, Japan Lobby for TPP-11, STRAIT TIMES (Apr. 21, 2017),
http://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/australia-japan-lobby-for-tpp-11 [https://
perma.cc/6KPS-EXXB}; KYODO, Mexican minister supports Japan’s leadership in achieving
TPP without U.S., JAPAN TIMES (July 31, 2017), https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/
2017/07/31/business/mexican-minister-supports-japans-leadership-achieving-tpp-with-
out-u-s/#.Wadwy7IjF0w [https://perma.cc/32U7-6DEB].  Some countries, such as Sin-
gapore, favor the TPP 11 proposal without stressing their support for Japanese
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less, the fact that only Japan and New Zealand ratified the TPP and the
remaining items to be finalized under the CPTPP may still cast doubt on
the eventual entry into force of the agreement.275
While the evolution of the TPP illustrates the structural North-South
divide, the relative development of the RCEP strengthens the theoretical
and substantive arguments for the NREO in Third Regionalism.  From the
new dependency theory perspective, the RCEP reaffirms the assertive legal-
ism of developing nations by enabling a new generation of South-South
FTAs to alter the subordinate relationship with the North.  The realpolitik of
international economic law elevated the RCEP from being considered a
Plan B for global regionalism to the only “on track” mega-regional agree-
ment that could considerably impact the multilateral trading system.
Markedly, the accession to the TPP is restricted to “any State or sepa-
rate customs territory,” which as an APEC member “the Parties may
agree.”276  In comparison, the RCEP’s open accession clause, which allows
“any ASEAN FTA partner” or “any other external economic partners,”
could result in a greater impact beyond the FTAAP.277  Pursuant to the
AEC Blueprint 2025, the new ASEAN-Hong Kong FTA constitutes a new
ASEAN+1 FTA and will pave the way for the Special Administrative Region
of China to join the RCEP.278  Furthermore, the 2016 ASEAN-Pacific Alli-
ance Framework for Cooperation that expedites integration between the
AEC and Latin America reinforces South-based cooperation.279  The poten-
tial coverage of additional APEC and TPP members, such as Chile and Peru,
can be the building block for the FTAAP and transform the RCEP as the
new trans-Pacific architecture.280
leadership. See Yoichi Funabashi, In America’s absence, Japan takes the lead on Asian free
trade, WASH. POST (Feb. 22, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/global-opin-
ions/wp/2018/02/22/in-americas-absence-japan-takes-the-lead-on-asian-free-trade/
?noredirect=on&utm_term=.C319d78e4332 [https://perma.cc/VW7U-BGY3].
275. See Annex II –  List of Suspended Provisions, supra note 273; Kelly Buchanan,
New Zealand: Ratification of Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement Completed, LAW LIBR.
CONGRESS: GLOBAL LEGAL MONITOR (May 23, 2017), http://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-
news/article/new-zealand-ratification-of-trans-pacific-partnership-agreement-completed
[https://perma.cc/6X47-2WZM]. For the TPP ratification process in 11 countries, see
Marina Tsirbas et. al., supra note 3, at 15; see also U.S. COALITION FOR TPP, U.S. Coalition
for TPP Diplomatic Working Group Newsletter, Issue 3, (Aug. 25, 2016), https://
www.usasean.org/system/files/downloads/u.s._coalition_for_tpp_diplomatic_working_
group_newsletter_issue_2.pdf [https://perma.cc/FZ4A-ALFM].
276. TPP, supra note 106, at art. 30.4.
277. Guiding Principles, supra note 46, at princ. 6.
278. AEC BLUEPRINT 2025, supra note 53, at 35; ASEAN-Hong Kong Statement, supra
note 59, at 1.  From a legal aspect, Taiwan, as an APEC member, could also join the
RCEP if China does not politically oppose.
279. The Pacific Alliance includes four Latin American countries and their bilateral
FTAs with ASEAN states serve as the groundwork for the region-to-region FTA. See
Ana¨ıs Faure, The New Trans-Pacific Partnership, DIPLOMAT (Apr. 5, 2017), http://thediplo-
mat.com/2017/04/the-new-trans-pacific-partnership [https://perma.cc/EJ9Y-W2W2].
280. See Nyshka Chandran, After US drops TPP, China joins member states in trade
talks, CNBC (Mar. 14, 2017), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/03/14/china-south-korea-
join-tpp-members-in-trade-talks.html [https://perma.cc/3DNM-TMES] (“At least two
TPP member countries, Chile and Peru, have also expressed interest in joining RCEP
talks.”).
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C. The Pro-Development Operative Mechanism
The RCEP stands unique among mega-regionals because of its South-
based origin and pro-development policy.  A functional operative mecha-
nism is essential to construct the RCEP as the normative foundation for the
Global South.  In line with ASEAN’s commitments to the Doha Develop-
ment Agenda and the UN Sustainable Development Goals, the RCEP will
incorporate “appropriate forms of flexibility, including” SDT provisions
and “additional flexibility” accorded to LDCs.281  The flexible mechanism
is at the core of the legal framework of South-South FTAs, but its opaque
interpretations run the risk of nullifying the RCEP’s effectiveness.  The
APEC principle of flexibility highlights the soft-law regime that empowers
members to choose their liberalization timeframes and exclude sensitive
sectors from liberalization.282  The intertwined non-discrimination princi-
ple, commonly referred to as “open regionalism,” often incurs free-riding
concerns about extending liberalization to non-members.283
The APEC practice should not be confused with ASEAN’s hard-law
notion of flexibility, which the RCEP will follow.284  The “ASEAN Minus”
formula that crystalized SDT provisions allows for flexible participation
and avoids the lowest common denominator dilemma under conventional
South-South FTAs.285  Subject to the Grand Bargain, ASEAN+1 FTAs
include lengthier yet clearly stipulated liberation timeframes for CLMV
countries.286  Entry into force provisions of ASEAN+1 FTAs similarly
adopted this formula.287
281. Guiding Principles, supra note 46, at princ. 4; see also ASEAN Taps on Vision
2025 to Support SDGs, ASEAN (June 25, 2016), http://asean.org/asean-taps-on-vision-
2025-to-support-sdgs-2.
282. ASIA-PACIFIC ECON. COOPERATION, THE OSAKA ACTION AGENDA: IMPLEMENTATION OF
THE BOGOR DECLARATION 2 (1995).
283. See id. at 1; Vinod K. Aggarwal & Elaine Kwei, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
(APEC): Transregionalism with a New Cause?, in INTERREGIONALISM AND INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS 67, 73 (Heiner Hanggi, Ralf Roloff & Jurgen Rulnd. eds., 2006) (explaining
four schools of thought on open regionalism).
284. See Guiding Principles, supra note 46, at princ. 4 (stipulating that the norm of
flexibility will be “consistent with the existing ASEAN+1 FTAs, as applicable”).
285. See Transcript of Reply by Minister for Foreign Affairs George Yeo to Questions in
Parliament, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFF., (Sing.) (Sept. 17, 2007), https://www1.mfa.gov.
sg/Newsroom/Press-Statements-Transcripts-and-Photos/2007/09/Transcript-of-Reply-
by-Minister-for-Foreign-Affairs-George-Yeo-to-questions-in-Parliament-17-Septemb [https:
//perma.cc/2JXU-JKYP].
286. For instance, the ASEAN-South Korea FTA’s tariff liberalization timeframes
include three categories: South Korea and ASEAN six countries; South Korea and Viet-
nam; and South Korea and Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar. See generally Annex 1, Agree-
ment on Trade in Goods Under the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic
Cooperation Among the Government of the Member Countries of the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations and the Republic of Korea, ASEAN-S. Korea (2006).  For ser-
vices and investment negotiations, see ASEAN-China Framework Agreement, supra note
260, at art. 8.3; see also Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Coopera-
tion Between the Republic of India and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations,
India-ASEAN, art 8.3, Oct. 8, 2003.
287. For example, “Australia, New Zealand and at least four ASEAN Member States”
could enable the AANZFTA to enter into force.  AANZFTA, supra note 146, at ch. 18, art.
7.2.  In this regard, the ASEAN-China Agreement is the only exception to the ASEAN
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The RCEP should further take into account ASEAN’s internal practice.
Article 21 of the ASEAN Charter codified the ASEAN Minus modality and
confined it to “the implementation of economic commitments” that all
ASEAN states decided by consensus.288  As the AEC’s services liberaliza-
tion evidences, two or more members could liberalize selected sectors and
permit the subsequent participation of other nations.289  Unlike APEC, the
concessions are only conferred on a reciprocal basis in order to eliminate
the free rider problem.  Arguably, the ASEAN Minus X formula could result
in fragmented commitments at divergent speeds.  A legal loophole may
exist when a state first agrees to its commitments, but then decides to opt
out of such commitments after finding the implementation difficult.290
Therefore, the RCEP’s elaboration of ASEAN’s flexibility rules will not only
benefit the AEC but also serve as a pro-development model for the South-
based FTAs.
For the sustainability of the mega-regional pact, I propose that the
ASEAN Secretariat provide institutional support for the RCEP.291  The
administrative design is often the last consideration of trade negotiators,
but is critical to the FTA’s enforcement, monitoring, and dispute settlement
proceedings.  The TPP provisions to create the Committee on Development
or the TPP Commission failed to consider the practical significance of an
impartial, permanent secretariat.292  It may be suggested that as the RCEP
functions as the pathway to the FTAAP, the institutional mechanism
should be based on the APEC Secretariat.  This position does not stand.
Contrary to APEC’s assertion to be “an incubator of issues related to the
FTAAP by providing leadership,” APEC’s role is limited to facilitating RCEP
or TPP discussions on the sidelines of APEC meetings.293  The FTAAP will
only “be realized outside of APEC” because APEC’s soft-law mechanism
Minus X rule. See PIETER JAN KUIJPER, JAMES H. MATHIS & NATALIE Y. MORRIS-SHARMA,
FROM TREATY-MAKING TO TREATY-BREAKING: MODELS FOR ASEAN EXTERNAL TRADE AGREE-
MENTS 97– 98 (2015).
288. ASEAN Charter, supra note 51, at art. 21.2.  The “ASEAN-X” modality, which is
different from “Two Plus X,” can be traced back to the Framework Agreement on
Enhancing ASEAN Economic Cooperation (1992). See SEVERINO, supra note 49, at
352– 53; WOON, supra note 60, at 158– 59. See also Chan Sze Wei, Decision-Making in the
ASEAN Charter Process, in 50 YEARS OF ASEAN AND SINGAPORE 235, 244 (Tommy Koh,
Sharon Seah Li-Lan & Chang Li Lin eds., 2017) (“AMM instructed HLTF that ASEAN-X
should be limited to the implementation of economic agreements.”).
289. Based on the Protocol to Amend the ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services,
art. I, Sept. 3, 2003 (adding Article IV bias (ASEAN Minus X modality) to the AFAS).
290. See SEVERINO, supra note 49, at 352– 53; Nikomborirak & Jitdumrong, supra note
55, at 59.
291. Under its $20 million budget, the ASEAN Secretariat currently has 300 staff
members recruited from Indonesia and other ASEAN states. See Termsak
Chalermpalanupap, No Brexit Repeat in ASEAN, DIPLOMAT (June 18, 2016), http://
thediplomat.com/2016/06/no-brexit-repeat-in-asean [https://perma.cc/4FMK-56HP].
292. See TPP, supra note 106, at arts. 23.7 & 27.1.
293. APEC Economic Leaders’ Declaration, Annex A: Lima Declaration on FTAAP,
ASIA-PACIFIC ECON. COOPERATION (Nov. 20, 2016), https://www.apec.org/Meeting-
Papers/Leaders-Declarations/2016/2016_aelm/2016_Annex-A [https://perma.cc/
9AKY-6YA7].
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remains unaffected.294  In addition, the absence of treaty-based legal per-
sonality resulted in APEC’s sui generis status.  As only Singapore law con-
ferred the 60-staff APEC Secretariat “the legal capacities of a body
corporate,” privileges and immunities cannot be asserted in foreign
proceedings.295
Distinctively, the legal standing of ASEAN under the ASEAN Charter is
reinforced by the conclusion of the ten-country agreement on privileges
and immunities.296  The agreement, along with the detailed pact concluded
between Indonesia and the ASEAN Secretariat, further extends functional
benefits to “experts on missions for ASEAN” and “permanent missions” of
foreign nations.297  The RCEP’s mutatis mutandis application in such rules
could increase the structural efficiency of the mega-regional agreement.
Moreover, for development purposes, the institutional memory of the
ASEAN Secretariat in enforcing the Initiative for ASEAN Integration that
assists CLMV countries is indispensable.298  The RCEP could consolidate
the funding basis and enhance the capacity-building of the Secretariat.
The streamlining of intra-ASEAN initiatives with parallel ASEAN+6 techni-
cal assistance projects will collectively narrow the development gap and
augment the pro-development effect for the Global South.
Conclusion
Emerging populist isolationism has diverted the path of the neoliberal
international economic order and cast doubt on the TPP and other trade
agreements.  To assess the RCEP’s evolution as a new trade architecture in
the Asia-Pacific, this Article provided the most up-to-date examination of
the implications of the 16-country mega-FTA for Asian regionalism and the
Doha Round.  By making interrelated theoretical and substantive claims,
the Article moved the conventional FTA discourse to a new dimension on
the assertive legalism of developing nations.  It further shed light on the
pivotal role of Global South powers in pursing the NREO based on new-
generation South-South FTAs.
294. Beijing Roadmap, supra note 266.
295. The International Organisations (Immunities and Privileges) (APEC Secretariat)
Order art. A.3, Feb. 12, 1993, G.N. No. S 25/1993.  The basis for the APEC Secretariat to
be established in Singapore is APEC’s 1992 Bangkok Declaration, which technically
does not constitute a “treaty.” See APEC Ministerial Meeting, Annex 3 –  Bangkok Decla-
ration on Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), ASIA-PACIFIC ECON. COOPERATION
(Sept. 10, 1992), https://www.apec.org/Meeting-Papers/Annual-Ministerial-Meetings/
1992/1992_amm/annex3 [https://perma.cc/ND4L-4XM3].
296. See ASEAN Charter, supra note 51, at art. 3; Agreement on the Privileges and
Immunities of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Oct. 25, 2009 [hereinafter
Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities]; WOON, supra note 60, at 75– 76.
297. Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities, supra note 296, at arts. 5– 8; Agree-
ment between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) on Hosting and Granting Privileges and Immunities
to the ASEAN Secretariat art. 15, Jan. 20, 1979.
298. AEC BLUEPRINT 2025, supra note 53, at 34– 35; AEC 2025 CSAP, supra note 85, at
44– 45.  In comparison, the TPP’s structural design for the “Committee on Development”
lacks the institutional memory and funding.  TPP, supra note 106, at art. 23.7.
